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INTRODUCTION
“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union
a Republican Form of Government . . . .”1 These words expound
the fundamental federal constitutional safeguard of representative democracy in American states. Conventional wisdom portrays this safeguard for a “Republican Form of Government” as
irrelevant to contemporary constitutional law and politics because the Supreme Court—and Congress, for that matter—will
not enforce the Guarantee Clause.2 Yet the real problem with the
Guarantee Clause is not that the United States enforces it too little, but that it enforces it too much. The Clause’s political theoretical contents have spilled into other enforceable constitutional
guarantees. There is no shortage of theories proffered to perfect
various conceptions of republicanism with the continuing expectation of federal, usually judicial, enforcement. 3 The Supreme
Court, and to a lesser extent the national political branches, have
taken the law of democracy beyond the basic rights of political
equality expressed elsewhere in the Constitution into the deeply
contested realm of republican theory: accountability and participation, majority rule and minority representation, deliberation
and responsiveness, equality and liberty of influence, legitimacy
and self-expression, and competition and stability. The interaction of these competing perfectionist conceptions of republicanism has led to the incoherence of the constitutional law of politics in the States. Federal efforts have produced a system in
which the States, the Union, and the Republican Form of Government would be better served by letting states do more, and
the United States less, to fulfill the guarantee.
There is an alternative pluralist conception of the republican
guarantee. The Supreme Court once conceded, even while it
opened the door to the one-person one-vote principle, “the lack
1. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
2. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases under the Guarantee Clause Should be Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 849, 849, 876 (1994).
3. See generally id.

No. 2]

Federalist Safeguards of Politics

417

of criteria by which a court could determine which form of
government was republican.”4 Despite this concession, however, questions about the Republican Form of Government pervade federal supervision of state election law by the Court and
its coordinate branches. The Court’s subsequent interpretation
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and of our federalism, masked underlying debates about distinct conceptions of
republicanism. Meanwhile the People, through the Constitution itself, refined the republican guarantee by extending the
right to vote to all races, 5 women, 6 the poor, 7 young adults, 8
and the People directly in electing their Senators. 9 Congress
further extended the guarantee through legislation enforcing
these amendments, thereby enabling the President to implement the guarantee in the States.10 The Guarantee Clause itself,
and with it any distinction between the States and the Union in
the constitutional regulation of politics, faded from view.
The submergence of the broad republican guarantee by these
narrower constitutional commitments helped the federal government improve the forms of government in the States. For a
time, a federal consensus on basic political equality took the
United States several steps toward a more perfect union. The
emergence of primaries eventually engaged more voters in the
process of party nominations. State and federal campaign finance regulation brought transparency and some measure of
equality to campaigns. In the first few decades after passage of
the Voting Rights Act, the Constitution empowered, the Congress enacted, the Executive enforced, and the Court upheld a
4. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 222 (1962); see also Evenwel v. Abbott, No. 14-940
(U.S. Apr. 4, 2016), slip op. at 7 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“So far
as the Constitution is concerned, there is no single ‘correct’ way to design a republican government.”).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1 (“The District
constituting the seat of Government of the United States shall appoint in such
manner as the Congress may direct: A number of electors of President and Vice
President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress
to which the District would be entitled if it were a State . . . .”).
10. See, e.g., Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.).
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powerful right of access to the franchise. 11 This consensus,
however, has long since ended. As the United States nears the
substantial fulfillment of basic political equality in the Second
Reconstruction, the current political stalemate among the federal legislative, executive, and judicial branches produces a
one-size-fits-all republican system that is as dysfunctional as it
is dominant.
After the Court in Bush v. Gore brought to light the “common,
if heretofore unnoticed, phenomenon” of serious problems in
local administration of federal elections,12 the President still conceded more than a decade later, “[W]e have to fix that.”13 In Citizens United, the Court prematurely heralded “[a] campaign finance system that pairs corporate independent expenditures
with effective disclosure” after invalidating restrictions on corporate campaign expenditures.14 But a gridlocked Federal Election Commission and Congress have repeatedly failed to take
executive or legislative action necessary to implement such a
system. The Court suggested in Shelby County v. Holder, after invalidating the Voting Rights Act’s central enforcement mechanism, that “Congress may draft another formula based on current conditions” to address discriminatory voting practices,15 a
suggestion unlikely to be taken up in the foreseeable future. The
one recent case in which the Court acknowledged dysfunction in
federal election regulation, the inaction of the understaffed Election Assistance Commission in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council,16
laid bare fundamental yet vague divisions among the Justices
about the scope of the federal government’s power to structure
elections in the states.17 Even the Guarantee Clause itself resur11. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
12. 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000).
13. See Brad Plumer, ‘We have to fix that,’ but will we?, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/decision2012/we-have-to-fix-that-butwill-we/2012/11/08/c83b4976-29ca-11e2-bab2-eda299503684_story.html
[http://perma.cc/7WCN-X5RB].
14. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010).
15. 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
16. See 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2260 (2013); see also id. at 2273 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The
EAC currently has no members, and there is no reason to believe that it will be
restored to life in the near future.”).
17. See id. at 2253 (“The [Elections] Clause’s substantive scope is broad.”); id. at
2261 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (“[I]n all events the State’s undoubted interest in the regulation and conduct of elections must be taken into account and
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faced in a challenge to a Colorado tax limit initiative. 18 The
Court’s decision in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission undermined the plaintiffs’ standing in
the Colorado case, but not before dropping a provocative footnote that “[p]erhaps not all claims under the Guarantee Clause
present nonjusticiable political questions.”19
This Article argues that states do and should play as important a role as the federal government in articulating and
implementing the law governing state political processes, or in
formal terms, their republican forms of government.20 The argument has four parts. Part I introduces the basic meaning of
the guarantee and its amendment. Beyond a consensus that
holds our republicanism to require basic political equality, various perfectionist conceptions of a republican form of government diverge, giving way to the essential pluralism of republican governments in a federal system. Part II explains how the
Supreme Court, Congress, and the Executive are now unable to
articulate, let alone implement, a workable national consensus
on any perfectionist republicanism beyond a thin conception of
those basic rights to political equality. Part III describes the
ought not to be deemed by this Court to be a subject of secondary importance.”);
id. at 2268 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“It is, thus, difficult to maintain that the Times,
Places and Manner Clause gives Congress power beyond regulating the casting of
ballots and related activities . . . .”); id. at 2271 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The Court
has it exactly backwards when it declines to apply the presumption against preemption because ‘the federalism concerns underlying the presumption in the Supremacy Clause context are somewhat weaker’ in an Elections Clause case like
this one.”).
18. Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 744 F.3d 1156, 1181 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding Guarantee Clause claims arising from state tax limit initiative are justiciable notwithstanding the political question doctrine), vacated and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 2927
(2015).
19. 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2660 n.3 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
185 (1992)).
20. The title of this Article plays on Herbert Wechsler’s famous The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). Wechsler’s thesis was “that the
existence of the states as governmental entities and as the sources of the standing
law is in itself the prime determinant of our working federalism,” so that the national political process protects federalism in the states. Id. at 546. This Article
inverts Wechsler’s claim, arguing that the existence of the States as the (primary)
sources of the standing law (of the political process) is itself the prime determinant of our working (or non-working) political process, so that state political processes protect the national political process.
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states as the source of persistent pluralism in their republican
forms of government, as both legal systems and political cultures that produce and are sustained by those systems. Part IV
argues that these distinctions in how states articulate and implement their own plural versions of republicanism are crucial
to efforts toward reforming, let alone perfecting, republicanism
at the national level. Given the unsettled visions of republicanism at the national level and the structural autonomy the states
must retain at the core of our federal system, a plurality of
views on republicanism among the states is not only durable
but desirable.
I.

REPUBLICANISM, PLURALISM, AND PERFECTIONISM

In defending the Constitution as “strictly republican,” James
Madison argued that it established a composition of both a “federal form [of government], which regards the Union as a Confederacy of sovereign states[,]” and “a national government, which
regards the Union as a consolidation of the States.”21 We might
recognize the same distinction in the Constitution’s guarantee of
republicanism in the States. The Guarantee Clause itself, alongside other direct constitutional guarantees of basic political
equality such as the extension of voting rights, contains both
federal and national modes of implementing republicanism.
The federal mode establishes the necessary terms for participating in the confederation, such as the Guarantee Clause’s
prohibition of state aristocracies that corrupt neighboring
states, or the Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition on race-based
discrimination in voting that undermines the reconstructed Union. 22 These provisions also contain important nationalizing
elements in terms of setting a floor of basic political equality
among individual citizens (no monarchs) and between classes
of citizens (no abridgement of the vote because of race) within
the States. Such rules unify the nation under a certain broad
conception of republicanism even as they preserve the confederation of autonomous States. For example, in addition to the
Guarantee Clause, the Constitution empowers the States to
21. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 280, 282 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed.,
1961).
22. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
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prescribe the time, place, and manner of federal elections subject to congressional alteration.23 Such provisions serve as the
Union’s shield to protect the federal republic against dangerous or uncooperative non-republican state governments. Primarily, the Constitution directly governs state political structures as a federal check against state departures from
republicanism that might jeopardize the national government.
Outside of such threats, the Constitution reserves to the States
a sphere of autonomy in formulating republicanism.24
This federal conception of the republican guarantee is pluralist. Beyond the consensus of basic political equality, and consistent with the security of the Union, pluralist republicanism
allows states to adapt their forms of government to their own
circumstances. These distinct republican forms mutually reinforce and are reinforced by distinct political cultures arising in
each state. An alternative national conception of the republican
guarantee, one that exceeds the scope necessary for basic political equality and the security of the union, might be called perfectionist. Rather than take the guarantee as a shield, perfectionist republicanism takes it as a sword for the Union to attack
state conceptions of republicanism that might differ from that
of the Union, or those the Union’s officers (legislative, executive, and judicial) might think ought to be imposed on the
States nationally. It nationalizes state politics by dissolving distinctions between the forms of government at the federal and
state levels.25 In its most pronounced form, republican perfectionism reads the Guarantee Clause to require the States to con23. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
24. The sphere is autonomous, not sovereign, due to Congress’s broad authority
to displace state regulation of federal elections under the Elections Clause and
prohibit state discrimination in voting under the voting rights amendments. See
Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalism as a Constraint on the Voting
Rights Act, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1195, 1202 (2012). On differences between sovereignty
and autonomy accounts, as well as the cooperative account, see Heather K.
Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1552 (2012) (describing
“the de jure autonomy associated with the sovereignty account; the de facto autonomy associated with process federalism; and the power of the servant, which
is the best way to conceptualize state power in cooperative federal regimes”).
25. The Author thanks Richard Pildes for clarifying the point that the argument’s concern is nationalization rather than federalization. See generally James A.
Gardner, The Myth of State Autonomy: Federalism, Political Parties, and the National
Colonization of State Politics, 29 J. L. & POL. 1 (2013).
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fer positive rights that the Constitution does not require from
the federal government.
A.

Republican Pluralism

Republican pluralism recognizes that there is no definitive
conception of a “Republican Form of Government.” In The Federalist, the guarantee’s co-drafter, Madison, described his view
of a republic as simply “a government in which the scheme of
representation takes place.”26 As Madison later suggests, this is
not to distinguish a republic from what is popularly termed a
democracy, a distinction that Akhil Amar notes “dissolves etymologically, with the res publica being a rough Latin equivalent of the Greek demos-kratia—rule by the demos, or people.”27
Rather, as the guarantee’s neighboring protections “against Invasion” and “against domestic Violence”28 suggest, one of its
purposes is “to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchical innovations,” particularly factions that may “possess
such a superiority of pecuniary resources, of military talents
and experience, or of secret succors from foreign powers.” 29
Within this federally enforced safety, the States may continue
“the existing republican forms,” or “choose to substitute other
republican forms” so long as “they shall not exchange republican for anti-republican Constitutions.”30 Outside of the scope of
the guarantee, the States would retain electoral autonomy, as
“the component parts of the State governments will in no instance be indebted for their appointment to the direct agency of
the federal government, and very little, if at all, to the local influence of its members.”31
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 129, 133 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed.,
1961).
27. Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular
Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749,
760 n.47 (1994).
28. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
29. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 311, 313 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed.,
1961).
30. Id. at 312.
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 327 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright, ed.
1961). For an important critique of this premise, see David Schleicher, Federalism
and State Democracy, 95 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (arguing many state and
local elections are “second order,” reflecting voter preferences about federal officials instead of the performance of state and local officials on the ballot).
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The Federalist should be read cautiously as the political advocacy it was, particularly when it promises to leave the States
and their governments alone while seeking their joinder in the
Union. Yet Robert Natelson’s thorough study of the original
understanding of the Guarantee Clause also concludes that the
Constitution provided little more guidance than to say, “With
respect to republicanism, choose the form you wish, so long as
your governments are controlled by your citizens, have no
kings (or, by another clause, no titled nobility), and honor the
rule of law.”32 Similarly, Akhil Amar finds in both its framing
and its practice, “The central meaning of Republican Government revolved tightly around popular sovereignty, majority
rule, and the people’s right to alter or abolish.”33 There is “nearconsensus,” observes Jacob Heller, that “republican governments rule (1) by the majority (and not a monarch), (2) through
elected representatives, [and] (3) in separate, coequal branches.”34 This much of the Guarantee Clause is clear and even justiciable in those fortunately rare instances where these basic
elements might be lacking.35
The republicanism of the Guarantee Clause is therefore more
practical than theoretical, more structural than rights-based,
and focused on a self-sustaining polity, not political perfection32. Robert G. Natelson, A Republic, Not a Democracy? Initiative, Referendum, and
the Constitution’s Guarantee Clause, 80 TEX. L. REV. 807, 856 (2002); see also Michael
W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current Consequences,
24 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 114 (2000) (“There are many systems of representation that would satisfy the Republicanism requirement. But at a minimum, the
Clause must mean that a majority of the whole body of the people ultimately governs.”).
33. Amar, supra note 27, at 786.
34. Jacob M. Heller, Note, Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Guarantee Clause Regulation of State Constitutions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1711, 1718 (2010).
35. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), the closest case in which an antebellum Supreme Court (that is, one unconcerned about the deep betrayal of
republicanism inherent in slavery) might have delivered on the guarantee, is
plausibly read to be about “not whether [Rhode Island’s pre-revolutionary royal]
charter regime was Republican, but whether it was a Government.” Amar, supra
note 27, at 776. Adam Kurland provides a fascinating account of a potential invocation of the guarantee in President Franklin Roosevelt’s consideration of another
extreme case, “Huey Long and the ‘totalitarian’ state of Louisiana,” as well as
more questionable cases of the House Un-American Activities Committee and the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. See Adam H. Kurland, The
Guarantee Clause as a Basis for Federal Prosecutions of State and Local Officials, 62 S.
CAL. L. REV. 367, 446–52 (1989) (emphasis omitted).
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ism. As Cass Sunstein explains, republicanism is an effort to
realize “a virtuous politics . . . without indulging unrealistic
assumptions about human nature.”36 The possibility of such a
politics is modeled in the United States Constitution’s “complex set of precommitment strategies, through which the citizenry creates institutional arrangements to protect against political self-interest, factionalism, failures in representation,
myopia, and other predictable problems in democratic governance.”37 As the broad text of the clause suggests, the diversity
of the ratifying states’ forms of government confirms that the
federal model was only one model, specially adapted to its federal functions, and not a casting mold to which the States
would need to conform.38 The nation of state republicanisms
under the Guarantee Clause is structuralist all the way down.
This is not to say that republicanism is indeterminate. Congress’s authoritative construction of the Guarantee Clause
played a critical role in conditioning the admission and readmission of states during Reconstruction on suffrage for freed
slaves.39 Since then, other constitutional provisions have refined
the guarantee, expressly extending it to include all races,40 women,41 the poor,42 young adults,43 and the People directly in choosing Senators.44 The Supreme Court supplemented these textual
constitutional guarantees with long-established political rights
36. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 21 (1993).
37. Id.
38. “‘All the States had governments when the Constitution was adopted. In all
the people participated to some extent, through their representatives elected in
the manner specially provided. These governments the Constitution did not
change. They were accepted precisely as they were, and it is, therefore, to be presumed that they were such as it was the duty of the States to provide. Thus we
have unmistakable evidence of what was republican in form, within the meaning
of that term as employed in the Constitution.’” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 222
n.48 (1962) (quoting Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 175–76 (1874)).
39. See Amar, supra note 27, at 780–82.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII (“The District
constituting the seat of government of the United States shall appoint in such
manner as the Congress may direct: A number of electors of President and Vice
President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress
to which the District would be entitled if it were a State . . . .”).
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derived from the First and Fourteenth Amendments, including
the right to speak, associate, and petition on political issues, and
a basic right to have one’s vote count equally. Richard Hasen
identifies these as a concept of essential political rights, and his
conception distinguishes these core equality principles as “basic
political equality rights [that] are absolutely essential for any
government to function as a democracy.”45 Together with the
republican guarantee, these rights set a floor of basic political
equality, above which states may adapt their own form of government consistent with their own conceptions of political equality and other republican values.46
Beyond this consensus of basic political equality, republicanism is an essentially contested concept.47 No comprehensive conception of republicanism can exist outside of how any
particular political community defines it at a particular time
in its development. 48 At a national level, however, no such
conception holds. At least as long as scholars have recognized
election law as a distinct field, they have debated the conflicting values republicanism is supposed to embody: accountability and participation, majority rule and minority representation, deliberation and responsiveness, equality and liberty of
influence, legitimacy and self-expression, competition and

45 . RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING
EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 79 (2003).
46 . See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics:
Reflections on the Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1156
(2002) (“[T]he Court in Baker set the floor for equality but not the ceiling. Presumably, by setting the floor, the Court permitted state actors to provide greater political equality, as many conceptions of political equality undoubtedly exist.”).
47. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE
LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 1 (1998)
(“There are many possible forms democracy can take, many different institutional
embodiments of democratic politics.”); Daniel H. Lowenstein, The Supreme Court
Has No Theory of Politics—and Be Thankful for Small Favors, in THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 283, 302 (David K. Ryden ed., 2d ed. 2002);
Dan M. Kahan, Democracy Schmemocracy, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 795 (1999).
48. See Elizabeth Garrett, Is the Party Over? Courts and the Political Process, 2002
SUP. CT. REV. 95, 152 (“Within the very broad outlines provided by the Constitution, courts should permit the political processes of local, state, and federal governments to work out their own precise forms of representative (and direct) democracy. These forms will doubtless vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and
change over time.”).
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stability, and so on.49 Standard accounts trace at least three
distinct and conflicting republicanisms—civic republicanism,
libertarianism, and pluralism—to Madison himself. What distinguishes the republican pluralism described here from other
perfectionist forms of republicanism in election law is the political community that defines it. While many accounts of election law look to judges (usually federal judges) to weigh and
resolve these conflicting republican values in state politics,50
republican pluralism acknowledges the guarantee is a (one of
many chosen by states), not the (one chosen by the federal
government), republican form of government in the States.
Republican pluralism is pluralist in the ordinary sense that a
republican form of government may exist in many distinct
forms consistent with republicanism. It is also pluralist in the
theoretical sense of embracing pluralism in politics among the
States. These republicanisms are politically contested. Once one
form satisfies the broad constitutional requirements of the
Guarantee Clause and basic political equality, there is no criterion outside of politics itself to assess its desirability. In each
state, that politics is partly a function of the republicanism it
sustains. It is this latter theoretical sense that Bruce Cain emphasizes in proposing “reform pluralism,” meaning first “a
more explicitly pluralist political reform agenda” that takes a

49. See, e.g., Charles, supra note 46, at 1142 (identifying key principles of “majority rule, political participation, accountability, responsiveness, substantial equality,
and interest representation”); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283, 356 (2014) (identifying, in addition to alignment of
elected representatives with voter preferences, “protecting individual rights such
as the franchise and the freedom to advocate one’s political views; promoting
electoral competition, especially when there is a danger of incumbent entrenchment; increasing voter participation, turnout in particular; respecting the political
equality of all citizens; and ensuring that minorities are represented adequately in
the halls of power.”); see also Michael S. Kang, To Here from Theory in Election Law,
87 TEX. L. REV. 787, 797 (2009) (reviewing HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY
INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION SYSTEM IS FAILING AND HOW TO FIX IT (2009)) (asking
whether “what seem like uncontroversial values in proposing that eligible voters
should be able to vote and that all valid votes should be counted . . . would become intense partisan struggles over voter registration, identification, and fraud
when the debate is made more specific”).
50. See, e.g., Charles, supra note 46, at 1162 (“[J]udges can—and must—utilize
democratic theory to direct their interpretation of the Constitution.”).
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realistic view of political contestation. 51 Second, however, he
also recommends “a blended approach” as “a kind of metapluralist principle” that recognizes the quantitatively plural distinctions a qualitatively pluralist politics creates when iterated
across many governing institutions, including states.52 This Article prioritizes the quantitative pluralism (or “metapluralism”)
reflected in the diversity of state republicanism forms and is
more agnostic about the priority of qualitative pluralism
among the possible republican values any one state realizes.
B.

Republican Perfectionism

Compared with republican pluralism, republican perfectionism
offers far more detailed (and contestable) constructions of the
guarantee.53 The sheer diversity of these conceptions reflects deep
disagreements about the constitutional regulation of politics in
general and the relationship of judicial review to that task in particular. The Guarantee Clause is not indeterminate, and Richard
Hasen may put it too strongly when he says, “‘Republicanism’ is
an empty vessel to be filled by whatever individual right the particular writer desires the courts to enforce.”54 But as Hasen suggests, any reading of the guarantee as a vessel for nationalizing
individual civil rights (beyond individual political rights) misses
its basic structural function as the Union’s shield and not a sword.
The history of the guarantee provides the backdrop to contemporary debates about republicanism that take place under more contested clauses.

51. BRUCE E. CAIN, DEMOCRACY MORE OR LESS: AMERICA’S POLITICAL REFORM
QUANDRY 195 (2015); see also Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political
Fragmentation, and the Decline of American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804, 827 (2014)
(“Unless we attend to the ways in which political power is actually mobilized,
organized, exercised, and marshaled, then policy proposals based on an individualistically driven vision of politics, or on non-grounded abstract democratic ideals
such as ‘participation,’ or ‘equality,’ can perversely contribute to undermining our
institutional capacity to govern.”).
52. CAIN, supra note 51.
53. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 34, at 1754–55.
54. Richard L. Hasen, Leaving the Empty Vessel of “Republicanism” Unfilled: An
Argument for the Continued Nonjusticiability of Guarantee Clause Cases, in THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 75, 82
(Nada Mourtada-Sabbah & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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In the past half-century, the argument for using the guarantee as the Union’s sword against the States begins with Arthur
Bonfield’s hope expressed on the eve of Baker v. Carr that “the
specific substance of republican government will be dictated by
contemporary values.” 55 His argument for broader political
rights guaranteed as a form of republican government extended from abolition of the poll tax, to universal free public education, and then to “[e]qual access for all to housing, employment, education, transportation and numerous other
things . . . .”56 This imperial conception of republicanism, Bonfield conceded, “might interfere a great deal in the internal
governance of the states.”57 More recently, Erwin Chemerinsky
argues that the Guarantee Clause should be an additional repository for federal courts to define and protect a similarly unenumerated, if not equally ambitious, set of “basic individual
rights.”58 Thomas Berg proposes more modest national modifications of state republicanism under the Guarantee Clause.59
Berg sees national republicanism as an avenue to enhance
democratic deliberation in the states by limiting delegation of
the legislative process and by strengthening rational basis review of legislative results.60 However, these proposals are still
quite remote from the core concerns of the clause.
Some readings of the clause do use the guarantee less as a
sword against the States and more as a shield to protect the Union, as well as particular conceptions of republicanism in the
States. Adam Kurland, for example, argues that the clause provides a positive grant of power supporting federal anticorruption legislation directed at state and local officials that is
broader than what the Commerce Clause may allow.61 Unlike
other theories of republicanism, he is careful not to read too
much into the guarantee beyond its provision of a rational basis
55. Arthur E. Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in
Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513, 560 (1962).
56. Id. at 564, 566.
57. Id. at 570.
58. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 869.
59. Thomas C. Berg, The Guarantee of Republican Government: Proposals for Judicial
Review, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 208, 242 (1987).
60. Id.
61. Kurland, supra note 35, at 446–52.
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for such legislation.62 In view of recent and not-so-recent history,
criminalizing corruption at the state and local level may well be
rationally related to preserving majority rule in, and protecting
the Union from, corrupt state and local officials.63
Conversely, Deborah Jones Merritt argues for using the
Guarantee Clause as a shield for state autonomy against encroachments on federalism values such as direct federal regulation of state governments.64 Indeed, this latter interpretation is
one of the few proposals to gain at least limited traction in the
Supreme Court. In New York v. United States, Justice O’Connor’s
opinion for the Court cited Merritt in partial support of an anticommandeering principle of federalism that ensures “state
government officials remain accountable to the local electorate.”65 This conception of the Guarantee Clause instantiates a
particular form of limited federal power beyond Article I enumerations and the Tenth Amendment canon of construction,
possibly as a way to rework intergovernmental immunities.66
Yet these claims simply hand the inapt sword of republicanism
from the Union to the States. Transforming the Guarantee
Clause from a multipurpose tool for nationalizing rights into a
multipurpose tool for decentralizing powers still misconceives
the clause as a sword, not a shield.
Merritt also makes a more structurally grounded argument
concerning the Guarantee Clause’s relationship to other constitutional provisions. She recognizes that the primary federal
constitutional constraints on the States’ political structures are
not found in the Guarantee Clause, but in other more direct
requirements of basic political equality such as the Fourteenth,
62. Id. at 459.
63. See, e.g., id. at 446–49 (describing Governor-Senator Huey Long’s “totalitarian” state of Louisiana); Monica Davey & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Jury Finds Blagojevich Guilty of Corruption, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2011), http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/06/28/us/28blagojevich.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/549M-22CE] (“A jury
on Monday convicted Rod R. Blagojevich, the former governor of Illinois, of a
broad pattern of corruption, including charges that he tried to personally benefit
from his role in selecting a replacement for President Obama in the United States
Senate.”).
64. Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism
for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 69–70 (1988).
65. 505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992).
66. Merritt, supra note 64, at 55–58.
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Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth
Amendments. 67 Merritt argues that beyond these specific requirements, “in the guarantee clause the United States promises to secure each of the states the autonomy necessary to maintain a republican form of government.”68 According to Merritt,
a republican government “is responsible to its voters rather
than to any outside agency.”69 Therefore, “[i]n order to ensure
that state and local governments remain responsive to their
constituents, those citizens must have the power to choose the
governmental forms that work best for them.”70 In other words,
the conception of the Guarantee Clause as a national shield to
protect the Union’s republicanism includes its guarantee that it
will not be used as a sword to attack States’ republicanisms.
Jacob Heller draws a similar distinction between “republicanism top-down and bottom-up,” 71 though he has greater
concerns about the state of republicanism in the States. Arguably dysfunctional state governments such as California’s lead
him to several “top-down” uses of the Guarantee Clause as a
sword. He would construe it to empower federal anticorruption legislation72 (following Adam Kurland),73 to require
one-person one-vote apportionment 74 (following Michael
McConnell), 75 and to support federal preclearance requirements for state election law changes under § 5 of the Voting
Rights Act 76 (following Richard Hasen). 77 Most ambitiously,
Heller reads the clause to prohibit “legislative power grabs”
that undermine the States’ administrative agencies78 and “ballot-box budgeting” through California’s spending initiatives.79
67. Id. at 38–39.
68. Id. at 22.
69. Id. at 41.
70. Id.
71. Heller, supra note 34, at 1724–25.
72. Id. at 1752–53.
73. See Kurland, supra note 35, at 435–52.
74. Heller, supra note 34, at 1755–56.
75. See McConnell, supra note 32, at 105–06.
76. Heller, supra note 34, at 1756–57.
77. See Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions
of the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 204–06 (2005).
78. Heller, supra note 34, at 1757–58.
79. Id. at 1758–60.
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The first three applications qualify as core uses of the clause as
a “shield” to protect the Union against non-republican forms of
corrupt or non-majoritarian government in the States. The last
two might qualify as a shield only in the extreme instances when
it is clear, as Heller suggests, that a state’s republican form of
government is suffering “death by a thousand cuts” through an
excess of administrative and fiscal micromanagement by law
and initiative.80 While Heller’s prescription may be overbroad
with respect to the initiative process,81 it recognizes what most
commentators miss in the text of the Guarantee Clause: that “[it]
does not apply to those matters not touching on a state’s form of
government[,]” such as public education or individual rights.82
Like Merritt’s argument that the Guarantee Clause implies
some level of state autonomy in choosing its republican form of
government, Heller’s “bottom-up” approach would deny the
federal government a sword against state governments in at
least one notable application. In Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla
Indians v. Superior Court,83 the California Supreme Court denied a
tribe federal common-law sovereign immunity from a state political practices investigation, holding that the Guarantee Clause
shielded the state’s political process from interference by federal
immunity. 84 Heller argues, convincingly, that this use of the
clause might serve as a model to shield state campaign finance
laws from the same level of scrutiny applied to federal campaign
finance laws. 85 The federal government ideally represents the
strongest republican form of government due to its own structural guarantees (including its enlarged sphere of representation) “that help prevent corruption from interfering with representation or majority will.”86 As Madison originally recognized,
the same cannot be said for the States, and strong federal constitutional attacks against the States’ own anti-corruption shields
80. Id. at 1759.
81. Compare Heller, supra note 34, at 1759 with Natelson, supra note 32, at 831–35
(arguing that the initiative power is consistent with the republican form of government).
82. Heller, supra note 34, at 1760.
83. 148 P.3d 1126 (Cal. 2006).
84. See id. at 1136–39.
85. Heller, supra note 34, at 1754–55.
86. Id. at 1755.
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not only distort the republican principles embodied in the freedom of speech,87 but also may subvert the Guarantee Clause.
An emergent case serves as a reminder of the potential perils
that may arise from a perfectionist reading of the Guarantee
Clause. A century ago, the Supreme Court rejected a Guarantee
Clause challenge to Oregon’s initiative process. 88 Notably, it
did not do so on the grounds that the initiative was consistent
with a republican form of government, but only that the question was “embraced within the scope of the powers conferred
upon Congress, and not therefore within the reach of judicial
power,” potentially leaving the federal government open to
regulate the state initiative process.89 Former Oregon Supreme
Court Justice Hans Linde argues that the initiative, when “misused” for certain purposes, violates the Guarantee Clause. 90
Apparently, no court had revisited this question until Kerr v.
Hickenlooper, a challenge to Colorado’s “Taxpayer Bill of
Rights” (TABOR) constitutional initiative. 91 On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit held that the Guarantee Clause is judicially enforceable and, in light of the ample interpretative tools offered
by originalism, susceptible to “judicially discoverable and
manageable standards.”92 The court was careful on an interlocutory appeal not to address the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim
that TABOR “undermines the fundamental nature of the state’s
Republican Form of Government,” 93 but the Supreme Court
vacated the judgment94 and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission.95 Still, such a sweeping attack
on a state constitution lies well beyond what is necessary for

87. See Anthony Johnstone, A Madisonian Case for Disclosure, 19 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 413, 462–65 (2012).
88. See Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
89. Id. at 151.
90. Hans A. Linde, Who Is Responsible for Republican Government?, 65 U. COLO. L.
REV. 709 (1994). But see Natelson, supra note 32, at 831–55 (arguing that the initiative is consistent with the Guarantee Clause).
91. 744 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2014).
92. Id. at 1174.
93. Id. at 1162.
94. Hickenlooper v. Kerr, 135 S. Ct. 2927 (2015) (memorandum opinion).
95. 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
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preservation of the Union or protection of basic political equality. It exemplifies republican perfectionism.
II.

THE NATIONALIZATION OF STATE POLITICS

The lack of meaningful consensus on the interpretation of the
republican guarantee among scholars has not prevented the
national government from attempting to impose various versions of republicanism masquerading as other federal powers
and rights. The dominant constitutional story tells of perfecting
the processes of democracy through representation-reinforcing
federal judicial intervention against legislation, especially state
legislation, that distorts the political process. 96 An extended
narrative includes congressional enactment and federal enforcement of voting rights and campaign finance reform legislation and, more broadly, the proposal by Congress and ratification by the States of constitutional amendments extending
voting rights. Throughout, the Supreme Court, abetted by
Congress (or the reverse, depending on the telling), champions
the Constitution’s evolving promise of ever-more-equal citizenship in an ever-more-perfect republic.
This story, much of which has become true, is near its end.
While substantial regression is unlikely given the hard-won
settlement of basic political equality expressed in constitutional
amendments and enforcing legislation, 97 federal progress beyond this settlement has run its course under the current constitutional regime. This settlement is the Union’s national
shield against anti-republicanism, and it remains strong in
guaranteeing within a reasonable range republican pluralism
in the States. Beyond this shield, no clear or coherent constitutional vision guides the Supreme Court or Congress to pick up
the sword and fight for any particular republican perfectionism. If it ever did, process theory no longer constrains courts,
no longer supports a consensus on its normative commitments,

96. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JU(1980).
97. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XV, XIX, XXIV, & XXVI; Voting Rights
Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq. But see infra note 264 and accompanying text
(discussing the hobbling of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act).
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and no longer provides usable policy guidance.98 To the contrary, the constitutional law of the political process is highly contested within the Supreme Court and between the Court and
Congress.
The story, termed “the constitutionalization of democratic
politics,”99 may be better understood as the nationalization of
state politics, defined broadly as the inclusion of the entire political structure of a state including its means of electing federal
officials. The national government “did not just judicialize election administration” and other aspects of state political structure, it “also federalized election litigation, moving much of it
from state to federal courts.”100 What distinguishes the end of
this story from its beginning is not that it is constitutional, but
that it is national to the exclusion of, and often at the expense of,
the states in a federal system.
The nationalization project has not failed. Rather, it helped
establish the basic political equality of previously unrepresented or underrepresented citizens.101 This strengthened the Union’s shield against sectionalism that denied broad classes of
the national population representation in our national and state
politics. It may be true that federal courts’ current construction
of constitutional law “does both too much—by inappropriately
extending rights doctrines into the design of democratic institutions—and too little—by declining to address self-entrenching
laws aggressively enough.”102 Yet given the nation’s substantial
progress toward political equality, there is no longer reason to
expect that the continued nationalization of state politics will
do any better than devolution to the States at further advancing
republican values, no matter how hard federal courts work to
get the constitutional law right. At the same time, there are a
number of reasons to expect that nationalization has done, and
will continue to do, worse by imposing “constraints on what
98. See HASEN, supra note 45, at 4–6.
99. See Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29, 31(2004).
100. Daniel Tokaji & Owen Wolfe, Baker, Bush, and Ballot Boards: The Federalization of Election Administration, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 969, 984 (2012).
101. See generally David Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1251 (2010).
102. Pildes, supra note 99, at 41.
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should be acceptable experimentation in the design of democracy.”103 Attempts to perfect any single vision of republicanism
on a national scale, rather than to sustain plural visions of republicanism at the state scale, risk undermining the latter
without achieving the former. The shield’s work is largely done
in guaranteeing republican forms of government in the States,
so it may be time for the Union to sheathe its sword.
A.

Congressional Nationalization

Congress is responsible for the most concrete advancements of
basic political equality through nationalization. Beyond the significant impact of the Voting Rights Act and subsequent relatively
minor administrative reforms, 104 however, Congress’s greatest
democratic achievements have been its partnerships with the
States in amending the Constitution to establish a textual basis for
basic political equality. Even with its own enforcement powers
under those Amendments, its contribution does not extend far
beyond the Voting Rights Act itself. Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment,105 the Constitution’s most explicit and self-executing
republican promise of an expanded franchise (though compromised at the expense of women), has become a dead letter.
Congress’s record in campaign finance reform is less inspiring. Even where it has been bold, as with the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), it has not been particularly
innovative. The centerpiece of Progressive Era campaign finance reform, the Corrupt Practices Act regulating corporate
103. Id. at 55.
104. See, e.g., The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, Pub.
L. No. 99-410, 100 Stat. 924 (1986); National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L.
No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (1993); Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002).
105. ”[W]hen the right to vote at any election . . . is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which
the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. See Franita
Tolson, What is Abridgment?: A Critique of Two Section Twos, 67 ALA. L. REV. 433,
434 (2015) (“This provision, which has never been enforced, provides that Congress can reduce a state’s delegation in the House of Representatives for denying
or abridging the right to vote in almost any election—state or federal—on almost
any grounds, with the exception of the commission of a crime.”).
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and other campaign funding, was not a product of the federal
government. Instead, it was conceived in the States and widely
adopted by the early twentieth century when federal campaign
finance legislation was still in its self-regulatory infancy.106 Beyond BCRA, which the Supreme Court and the hydraulics of
campaign finance107 largely thwarted, Congress has either proceeded incrementally (the Help America Vote Act in 2002) or
reiteratively (the Voting Rights Act reauthorization in 2006).
Even such modest advances seem ambitious relative to the current pace and scope of federal legislation.
More importantly for campaign finance and Congress’s structuring of republicanism in general, the unintended system resulting from the interaction of legislation, judicial review, and
executive inaction is paralyzed by hyperpolarization that makes
even minor reforms impossible.108 As Lawrence Lessig explains,
“The forces that would block [reform] work well and effectively
on Capitol Hill, and inside the Beltway. That is their home.”109
For the few reforms where consensus might otherwise be possible, such as election assistance to states, malfunctioning budget
and appointments processes prove insurmountable.110

106. See LOUISE OVERACKER, MONEY IN ELECTIONS 294–95 (1932); Robert E.
Mutch, Before and After Bellotti: The Corporate Political Contribution Cases, 5 ELECTION L.J. 293, 293 n.1 (2006).
107. See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1999).
108. See Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CAL. L. REV. 273 (2011).
109. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—
AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 275 (2011). See also Richard Pildes, The Future of Voting
Rights Policy: From Anti-Discrimination to the Right to Vote, 49 HOW. L.J. 741, 763
(2006) (Conceding at the time of the 2006 Voting Rights Act reauthorization,
“There is simply no constituency . . . to ask hard questions about what the future
of voting rights ought to look like. Instead, there is every incentive for the critical
actors to avoid these questions altogether.”).
110. See, e.g., Amanda Becker, The Phantom Commission: Agency Formed to Restore
Confidence Is in Disarray, ROLL CALL (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.rollcall.com
/issues/58_33/Agency-Formed-to-Restore-Confidence-in-Elections-Is-in-Disarray218616-1.html [http://perma.cc/MRE3-D6XR] (describing the U.S. Election Assistance Commission on its tenth anniversary thus: “Its four commissioner spots are
vacant. The executive director resigned last year. Its general counsel left in May. It
has lacked a quorum to conduct official business for almost two years. Congressional gamesmanship has hamstrung the commission by neither giving it necessary resources nor eliminating it outright.”).
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Executive Nationalization

The federal legislation with the most transformative potential
in the areas of voting rights and campaign finance faces uneven
enforcement in the executive branch. The Voting Rights Act
produced a record of uneven enforcement, particularly under
the now impotent preclearance requirements of Section 5.111 The
lead enforcer and interpreter of federal campaign finance law,
the Federal Election Commission (FEC), is subject to partisan
nonenforcement by its deadlocked design; 112 the only serious
dispute is whether that is a good or a bad thing. More work
might be done on the causes and effects of partisan enforcement
of federal election law, but suffice it to say that some campaign
finance reform advocates view the Securities and Exchange
Commission, or even the Internal Revenue Service, as a more
promising enforcer of political transparency than the FEC.113
C.

Judicial Nationalization

The Supreme Court stands at the center of the federal government’s nationalization of state politics. Its banner was once the
Carolene Products doctrine of heightened scrutiny for state legisla-

111. See Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own
Success?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710 (2004); see also Daniel P. Tokaji, If It’s Broke, Fix
It: Improving Voting Rights Act Preclearance, 49 HOW. L.J. 785, 798–819 (2006).
112. See Trevor Potter, How the FEC Can Stop the Tidal Wave of Secret Political
Cash, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions
/how-the-fec-can-stop-the-tidal-wave-of-secret-political-cash/2012/11/16/966c48cc2dae-11e2-89d4-040c9330702a_story.html [http://perma.cc/7YAZ-V77M] (“It is the
FEC and the permissive regulations it has created over the past decade that have
allowed close connections between candidates, parties and political action committees. And it is the agency’s dysfunctional state—engineered by a Republican
congressional leadership adamantly opposed to campaign finance reform—that
has turned the Supreme Court’s promise of transparency into a joke.”).
113. Lucian Bebchuk & Robert Jackson Jr., Shining Light on Corporate Political
Spending, 101 GEO. L. J. 923 (2013) (arguing for the SEC to develop rules requiring
that public companies disclose their spending on politics); Jonathan Weisman,
Scrutiny of Political Nonprofits Sets Off Claim of Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/us/politics/irs-scrutiny-of-politicalgroups-stirs-harassment-claim.html [http://perma.cc/9ZHJ-94J7]. But see Treasury
Inspector General for Tax Administration, Inappropriate Criteria Were Used to Identify Tax-Exempt Applications for Review, Ref. No. 2013-10-053 (May 14, 2013) (“The
IRS used inappropriate criteria that identified for review Tea Party and other organizations applying for tax-exempt status based upon their names or policy positions instead of indications of potential political campaign intervention.”).
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tion that “restricts those political processes which can ordinarily
be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation.”114
Yet even Reynolds v. Sims,115 the initial stage of clearing the most
widespread political process blockage of malapportionment, did
not advance any effective conception of republicanism beyond an
important but technical rule of “one-person, one-vote” that has
been overwhelmed by redistricting technology.116
We are not likely to see the Court create a republican representational principle on the scale of Reynolds again anytime soon.
With one notable but self-limiting exception, 117 the Supreme
Court has excused itself from the political thicket of justiciable
political equality under the Fourteenth Amendment.118 More recent racial and political gerrymandering cases suggest the reapportionment revolution’s legacy of a justiciable and substantive
standard of political equality may not progress farther than a
strict quantitative, not qualitative, standard. 119 Notably, the
Court in Evenwel v. Abbott appeared to defer to the consensus
practice in the States by rejecting a claim that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires states to use voter population, rather than
total population, in apportioning state legislative districts. 120
Once again, however, the unanimous judgment’s seeming endorsement of that consensus concealed deep divisions in the
114. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
115. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
116. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71
TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1993).
117. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
118. But see Ne. Ohio Coal. For the Homeless v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir.
2012) (holding that denial of the vote for voting at the wrong polling place due to
poll worker error violated the Equal Protection Clause); Obama for Am. v.
Husted, 697 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that contracting the early voting
period for all voters except certain military voters violated the Equal Protection
Clause). These cases may represent a kind of republican pluralism to the extent
they arise from panels of regionally based circuit courts, rather than the centralized Supreme Court.
119. See Ala. Leg. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1272 (2015) (remanding potential racial gerrymandering claims for district-by-district reconsideration, and reserving the question whether intentional use of race in redistricting
triggers strict scrutiny).
120. Evenwel v. Abbott, No. 14-940 (U.S. Apr. 4, 2016), slip op. at 18 (“Adopting
voter-eligible apportionment as constitutional command would upset a wellfunctioning approach to districting that all 50 States and countless local jurisdictions have followed for decades, even centuries.”).
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Court’s approach to state republicanism. It drew a concurrence
from Justice Thomas that invoked the Guarantee Clause directly:
As the Framers understood, designing a government to
fulfill the conflicting tasks of respecting the fundamental
equality of persons while promoting the common good requires making incommensurable tradeoffs. For this reason,
they did not attempt to restrict the States to one form of
government. Instead, the Constitution broadly required that
the States maintain a “Republican Form of Government.”
But the Framers otherwise left it to States to make tradeoffs
and reconcile the competing goals.121

The relative uniformity of state apportionment practices allowed the Court in Evenwel to avoid a choice between respecting state practices as legitimate expressions of diverse republican pluralism on the one hand, and using those practices as
evidence of uniform republican perfectionism on the other. It
remains to be seen which approach will predominate if and
when a state departs from the consensus practice.
The Court’s other interventions in political party, ballot access, and voting administration cases work only at the margins
of a complex system of partisan politics, and as with gerrymandering, the Court has signaled its reluctance to intervene
further.122 Even setting aside its long history of narrowly construing possible constitutional bases for expanding the franchise, the Court’s record on Congress’s constitutional extension

121. Id. slip op. at 12 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted);
see also id. slip op. at 2–3 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[An argument
that the Constitution requires either population-based or voted-based apportionment] implicates very difficult theoretical and empirical questions about the nature of representation. For centuries, political theorists have debated the proper
role of representatives, and political scientists have studied the conduct of legislators and the interests that they actually advance. We have no need to wade into
these waters in this case, and I would not do so.”). With similar concern, Derek
Muller notes that the Court’s opinion in Evenwel “used strong language on its
views of political theory . . . as if these were the Court’s settled beliefs on how
political representation ought to be.” Derek Muller, Response, Evenwel v. Abbott,
GEO. WASH. L. REV. DOCKET (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.gwlr.org/evenwel-vabbott-a-new-attempt-to-define-one-person-one-vote/
[http://perma.cc/45FBHVW2]. See generally Derek T. Muller, Perpetuating “One Person, One Vote” Errors,
39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 371 (2016).
122. See Wash. St. Grange v. Wash. St. Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008);
Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
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of voting rights is mixed.123 In Shelby County v. Holder, the Court
exposed basic disagreements about the role of Congress and
itself in assessing, let alone guaranteeing, political equality in
the States.124 In so doing, it revealed again that the Court participates in, rather than adjudicates, the contest between particular forms of republicanism at the national level.
Notwithstanding the theoretical attraction of extending judicial representation-reinforcement to police the political process
further, the actual Court has provided little reason to believe it
could articulate and implement a coherent theory of republicanism.125 The Court may not do much better than the current state
political institutions it polices so as to justify displacing them.126
Indeed, as Edward Foley argues, “[T]here is no guarantee that
constitutional constraints designed to curb partisan favoritism in
the legislature will be implemented in a nonpartisan manner by
conventional courts, whether elected or appointed.”127 Beyond
enforcing the thin settlement of basic political equality achieved
through constitutional amendments credited equally to Congress and to some measure the ratifying states, the Court as an
institution has proven itself incapable of nationalizing state politics to the end of perfecting any particular form of republicanism. The incoherence is as broad as it is deep, extending to comprehensively researched yet divided decisions on fundamental
questions of politics like term limits and pamphleteering.128
123. Compare Harper v. Va. St. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) with Oregon
v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), abrogated by U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
124. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
125. Campaign finance is a leading example. See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens
United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581 (2011).
126. See Richard L. Hasen, Judges as Political Regulators: Evidence and Options for
Institutional Change, in RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: RECURRING PUZZLES IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 101 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles,
Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang eds., 2011).
127. Edward B. Foley, The Separation of Electoral Powers, 74 MONT. L. REV. 139,
144 (2013).
128. For two notable examples occurring in a single Term, see U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (invalidating state term limits for federal officials under the Qualifications Clauses by a vote of 5-4, with detailed examinations
of history and practice on both sides); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514
U.S. 334 (1995) (invalidating ballot issue campaign attribution law under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments by a vote of 7-2, with Justice Thomas concurring
and Justice Scalia dissenting on originalist grounds). For a more recent example,
see Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010) (upholding state law allowing ballot issue
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Meanwhile, the Court’s scrutiny of modern campaign finance reform efforts has transformed the First Amendment’s
republican values of democratic opportunity into libertarian
values of a pluralist political marketplace.129 According to the
Court’s view in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
“[d]emocracy is premised on responsiveness[,]” and “[i]t is in
the nature of an elected representative to favor certain policies,
and, by necessary corollary, to favor the voters and contributors who support those policies.”130 Although the dissent credited the majority with entrenchment concerns reflecting a
broader republican suspicion of “an incumbency protection
plan,” it had to turn to an earlier case to find them.131 The Court
extended its pluralist (but not pluralism-respecting) theory of
representation in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, a
case involving the right of a constituent of one representative to
contribute to an unlimited number of representatives of other
constituencies, with what appears to be a bold reframing of the
American tradition of representation: “[C]onstituents [of the
government but not of the candidate] support candidates who
share their beliefs and interests, and candidates who are elected
can be expected to be responsive to those [donors’ not constituents’] concerns.”132 The Court’s general theory of republicanism
expressed in these campaign finance cases supports its easy
elision of federal and state politics133 and may undermine federalism by opening the States’ distinct republicanisms to further nationalizing forces.134
signature petition disclosure by an 8-1 vote, but splintering into four concurrences
joined by six justices and a dissent).
129. See Johnstone, supra note 87.
130. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n., 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010) (quoting
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n., 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part)).
131. Id. at 460 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132. 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014).
133. See Am. Tradition Partn., Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per
curiam) (holding that “[t]here can be no serious doubt” that the Court’s analysis
of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 applies identically to Montana’s
popularly enacted Corrupt Practices Act of 1912); see generally Anthony Johnstone,
The State of the Republican Form of Government in Montana, 74 MONT. L. REV. 5
(2013).
134. See Garrick B. Pursley, The Campaign Finance Safeguards of Federalism, 63
EMORY L.J. 781 (2014) (arguing that the rise of Super PAC spending of unlimited
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In one recent case, a different composition of the Court suggested it may be unwilling, in some circumstances, to move
state election law further toward nationalization. Arizona State
Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission presented the question of whether an independent redistricting
commission enacted by popular initiative qualified under the
Elections Clause as a “Legislature” competent to prescribe the
“Times, Places and Manner” of congressional elections. 135 In
Madison’s terms, the case asked whether the Constitution uses
“Legislature” in the Elections Clause in a national sense (for the
nation) or a federal sense (for the state in confederation). Despite the apparently clear text, and with the benefit of a close
analysis of constitutional structure and history, the Court read
the Clause in its federal sense, and left to the States the power
to govern federal elections—in the absence of congressional
action—according to their own view of the legislative power in
a republic.
Other cases on the horizon will present similar questions and
again invite the Court to nationalize new rules of state republicanism. The Court avoided reaching the merits of Kerr v. Hickenlooper, but not without acknowledging the potential justiciability of its Guarantee Clause claim in a footnote to Arizona
State Legislature.136 That provocative citation, and Justice Thomas’s invocation of the Guarantee Clause in Evenwel, suggests
the Court will continue to engage the arguments between republican perfectionism and republican pluralism, perhaps with
a helpful return to the constitutional text. As the Court reconsiders the justiciability of the Guarantee Clause, its text serves
as an important reminder of its function as the Union’s shield
for the defense against anti-republicanism in the States, and not
as the Union’s sword for the imposition of a particular republicanism on the States.

amounts across state lines erodes the links between federal representatives and
their state constituencies, weakens parties as a vector for influence by state parties
over national politics, and may drown out traditional intergovernmental lobbies
that speak for the States).
135. 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
136. Id. at 2660 n.3 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992))
(“[P]erhaps not all claims under the Guarantee Clause present nonjusticiable political questions.”).
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THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF STATE REPUBLICANISMS

National republicanism may be incoherent, but is state politics
any different or better? Distinct state republicanism may be
merely a romantic notion overtaken by centralizing legal and
political forces.137 Once, perhaps, states constituted distinct political communities, but those were long ago displaced by factional
interests working on a national scale. On this account, the mobility of individuals, parties, and campaign funds renders states as
scenery on the national political stage. More pessimistically,
even if states satisfy the constitutional requirements of basic political equality, distinct state republicanism only masks the partisan capture of state election laws for purely factional ends.138
Drawing on Madison’s suspicion of the factional disease afflicting state politics, this account finds the necessary republican
cure at the national level. As bad as it might be at the national
level, the argument goes, it is worse in the States.
Like other claims grounded in federalism principles, the existence and desirability of republican pluralism in the States
depends on a significant degree of state autonomy in formulating election law. That legal autonomy must be more than theoretical or merely out of lockstep with federal law. It should be
demonstrated in practice, producing “laboratories of democracy” in the truest sense of those words. That legal practice
should be consequential, associated with diverse political cultures either preserved by or producing distinct systems of elec137. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, The Myth of State Autonomy: Federalism, Political
Parties, and the National Colonization of State Politics, 29 J.L. & POL. 1 (2013) (arguing
that the rise of the national political parties has led to the colonization of state
politics to the exclusion of political autonomy); Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley,
Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994) (arguing
that states do not constitute significant political communities distinct from the
national political community).
138. In an illuminating argument, Yasmin Dawood defines and criticizes the
“partisan state,” where partisanship not only dominates “first-order” general
policy consistently with democratic theory, but also dominates “second-order”
electoral policy inconsistently with self-government. Yasmin Dawood, Democracy
and the Problem of the Partisan State, in LOYALTY: NOMOS LIV 257, 258–59 (Sanford
Levinson et al. eds., 2013); see also Joshua Douglas, (Mis)Trusting States to Run
Elections, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 553 (arguing federal judicial deference has encouraged states to adopt laws rigged to benefit the party in power); Justin Levitt, Election Deform: The Pursuit of Unwarranted Electoral Regulation, 11 ELECTION L.J. 97
(2012).
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tion law. Only then, if states are both legally and culturally distinctive, can we turn to an assessment of whether those distinctions are valuable to state and national politics.
It is worth asking, when we are this far along in the nationalization of state politics, if distinct state political cultures with distinct state conceptions of republicanism are becoming obsolete.
The same financial and political forces that drive federal gridlock push money, political consultants, campaign advertising,
and increasingly legislation out to the States, while exerting a
gravitational pull on state-level politicians toward Washington,
D.C. Recently, William Marshall concluded, “The uniqueness of
a state’s political culture and therefore the need to preserve
it . . . may be rapidly becoming a relic of the past.”139 Yet the persistence of states as distinct political systems—the persistence of
republican pluralism—is hard-wired into national politics in
several constitutional and extra-constitutional ways. Most obviously, after all the outside campaign money is spent, even Congress still must be elected “by the People of the several States,”
and presidential electors must be appointed in a manner directed by state legislatures. 140 Aside from this basic electoral
connection, the discussion below reviews the range of policies
and practices in which states remain distinct from each other
and from the national government.
The strongest claim opposing distinct state republicanisms,
that we have only one national republicanism, is overstated at
least. National republicanism relies on distinct state rules for
voting qualifications, election administration, political party
organization, and districting. Even the broadest federal
preemption under the Elections Clause, by a hypothetical Congress with an unprecedented appetite for centralization, could
139. William P. Marshall, The Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Regulation:
Should Differences in a State’s Political History and Culture Matter?, 74 MONT. L. REV.
79, 100 (2013).
140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
Notably, the slates of presidential electors are determined by nominating primaries and caucuses held in just a handful of states at a time and controlled by each
state’s distinct political party structure. The first states to cast votes are culturally
distinct from the nation as a whole. See Asma Khalid, The Perfect State Index: If
Iowa, N.H. Are Too White To Go First, Then Who?, NPR.ORG (Jan. 29, 2016),
http://www.npr.org/2016/01/29/464250335/the-perfect-state-index-if-iowa-n-h-aretoo-white-to-go-first-then-who [http://perma.cc/2EHE-GH2S].
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not entirely displace the States’ role in national elections. Practically, moreover, “Congress has left much of its arguable power over election law on the table unused . . . .”141 In state elections, local campaign finance and lobbying laws come into
play, as does a typically longer slate of elected offices and
broader calendar of election dates. It is possible that pressure
from national parties and interest groups could compress any
possible political distinctions into an undifferentiated mass of
election law reflecting a national republicanism. But the policies and practices in the States do not bear this out. There remain important, persistent distinctions among the legal regimes of state republicanisms, and these regimes produce and
are preserved by distinct political cultures.
A.

Legal Distinctions

An American today experiences more variation in elections
than she does in just about any other aspect of her participation in
mass culture, from what is playing on the radio when the alarm
goes off, to the coffee shop, to the morning commute, to the
workplace, to the lunch out, to the shopping trip on the way
home, to the street where she lives. Within broad ranges of urban,
suburban, and rural culture, these ordinary experiences may be
indistinguishable. Yet on Election Day, everything changes.
Most of these distinctions are not merely functions of election
officials’ competence or best practices. There are vast and troubling variations in competence, to be sure. The legitimate
breadth of these policy variations is telling, however. The leading bipartisan and nonpartisan efforts at election reform reach
consensus on a number of effective “one size fits all” election
metrics and rules, but they avoid the deeper value judgments
(or partisan calculations) reflected in voter ID laws or particular means of early voting, let alone party rules and campaign

141. Kirsten Nussbaumer, The Election Law Connection and U.S. Federalism, 43
PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 392, 395 (2013) (arguing that Congress forbears because
state legislators represent an important constituency for members of Congress,
who may owe their careers not only to their formative years of work within the
state party, but also the formation of favorable constituencies through the redistricting process).
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finance regulation.142 Nor are these distinctions simply a function of partisanship. For most election rules, significant variations occur among red and blue states, and within regions.
1.

Election Administration

“Election Day” itself varies significantly among states. Primary campaigns kick off nearly a year before the election for
March primaries in Illinois and Texas. They kick off in September, just two months before the general election primary, in
Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island.
Louisiana holds no primary, but holds a runoff election in December if necessary. 143 General election campaigns therefore
can run between two and nine months, depending on the state.
Two-thirds of states offer some form of early voting, beginning
an average of 22 days before the election and as early as 45
days before the election.144 Twenty-two states allow early voting on weekends.145 Twenty-seven states allow “no-excuse” absentee voting by mail, and three states (Colorado, Washington,
and Oregon) require voting by mail.146
Once the traditional Election Day arrives, eleven states provide same-day registration.147 A citizen is more likely to be registered to vote already in Mississippi (84% registration) and
Colorado (74% registration) than if she lived next door in Arkansas (65% registration) or Wyoming (64% registration); vot-

142. See ROBERT F. BAUER, ET AL., THE PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON ELECTION ADMIN., THE AMERICAN VOTING EXPERIENCE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON ELECTION ADMINISTRATION (2014); PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ELECTION ADMINISTRATION BY THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF
AVAILABLE DATASETS AND HOW TO USE THEM (2012).
143. 2014 Calendar: State Primary Dates and Runoff Dates, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/2014-state-primary-dates-and-runoff.aspx
[http://perma.cc/H9T9NUP8].
144. Absentee and Early Voting, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 11,
2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/absentee-and-earlyvoting.aspx [http://perma.cc/X4H3-S8J2].
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Same Day Voter Registration, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 2,
2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/same-day-registrati
on.aspx [http://perma.cc/4LRL-BPM7].
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ers need not register at all in North Dakota.148 In states where
there are still polling locations, opening hour varies from as
early as 5 a.m. in Vermont (6 a.m. in ten other states) to as late
as 11 a.m. in neighboring New Hampshire, and closing hour
varies from as early as 6 p.m. in Hawaii and Kentucky to as late
as 9 p.m. in Iowa, New York, and North Dakota.149 A voter may
wait to vote only a few minutes in Mississippi or New Jersey,
but half an hour or longer in Florida or Maryland.150 In the 2014
election, 31 states required voter identification, ten of which
had a requirement that a voter without identification take additional action after Election Day for a provisional ballot to be
counted.151 Fifteen of these voter identification states required
photo ID while sixteen accepted photo or non-photo IDs.152 In
local and special district elections, nonresidents may vote in
twelve states, and non-citizens may vote in a small but growing
number of localities.153 Convicted felons can vote from prison
in Maine and Vermont, but may never vote again in twelve
states with permanent felon disenfranchisement where ineligible felons may make up as much as ten percent of the voting
age population.154
148. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF 2012,
https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2012/tables
.html [http://perma.cc/3WXJ-F37K] (Table 4a, Column G); N.D. Cent. Code § 16/1010-05.1.
149. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 283–84 (Table 6.5)
(2014), available at http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/6.5%202014.pdf
[http://perma.cc/XC7Z-YQKA].
150. Charles Stewart III, 2012 Survey of the Performance of American Elections
79 (Feb. 25, 2013) (draft), available at http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/21624
[http://perma.cc/7GKU-VRBB].
151. Voter Identification Requirements, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct.
6, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx
[http://perma.cc/UQ9K-2WHU]. The data exclude Pennsylvania’s strict photo ID
law, invalidated by a state court, and North Carolina’s strict voter ID law, which
has an implementation date of 2016 and is currently the subject of ongoing litigation.
152. Id.
153. Voting by Nonresidents and Noncitizens, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES
(Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/nonresident-and-non-citizen-voting.aspx [http://perma.cc/SN4H-BXN6].
154. CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010, at 3–4 (2012).
Including permanently disenfranchised felons, Florida may disenfranchise 10% of
its voting-age population, Mississippi 8%, and Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia
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Constituencies and Districting

One of the most fundamental and contested questions of representation, the choice between size of constituency and size of
legislative body, is answered in a variety of ways by the States.
State senates range from as large as sixty-three (New York) and
sixty-seven (Minnesota) to as small as twenty (Alaska) and
twenty-one (Delaware and Nevada). 155 State houses and assemblies range from as large as 400 (New Hampshire) to as low
as forty (Alaska), forty-one (Delaware), and forty-two (Nevada); Nebraska lacks a lower house. 156 Senate constituencies
range from more than 800,000 (Texas) and 900,000 (California)
to less than 14,000 (North Dakota). 157 House constituencies
range from more than 465,000 in California to less than 10,000
in Montana, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Wyoming.158 California’s average assembly constituency is the only
constituency close in size to a congressional district, and more
than 100 times larger than the house constituencies in New
Hampshire (3,291) and Vermont (4,172).159 The smallest seven
state houses and smallest five state senates today are smaller
than the U.S. House and Senate, respectively, in 1789.160 Seven-

7%. Id. Another analysis excludes permanently disenfranchised felons in his estimates due to a lack of data or updated methodology. It calculates total disenfranchised felons in 2014 as high as 4% of voting-age population in Georgia, with seven other states at 2% or more: Mississippi, Alaska, Delaware, Idaho, Arkansas,
Texas, and Louisiana. See Michael P. McDonald, 2014 November General Election
Turnout Rates, UNITED STATES ELECTIONS PROJECT (Dec. 30, 2014),
http://www.electproject.org/2014g [http://perma.cc/F5F7-2YUR] (calculating ineligible felons as a percentage of voting age population per state).
155. THE BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 153, at 275–76 (Table 6.2), available at
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/6.2%202014.pdf
[http://perma.cc/DJE3-3DKX].
156. Id.
157. 2010 Constituents per State Legislative District Table, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (2010), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/2010constituents-per-state-legislative-district.aspx [http://perma.cc/DFL8-3E6M].
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. In the first Congress, the House and Senate had 65 and 26 members,
respectively. See U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Congress Profiles: 1st Congress
(1789-1791),
http://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/1st/
[http://perma.cc/9QQA-LYDZ] (last visited Nov. 14, 2015).

No. 2]

Federalist Safeguards of Politics

449

teen states have house constituencies smaller than the 30,000
minimum the Constitution sets for Congress.161
All state legislators have either two- or four-year terms,162
and nearly all state executive officers have four-year terms.163
Beginning in 1990 with California, Colorado, and Oklahoma,
and ending with Nebraska in 2000, twenty-two states enacted
term limits on executive or legislative officials by statutory or
constitutional initiative.164 Combined with pre-existing executive term limits, thirty-seven states limit the term of their governor and other executive branch officials.165 Four states invalidated term limits by state supreme court decision, and another
two repealed them by legislative action.166 The wave of term
limit laws represents one of the more successful recent efforts
to nationalize state politics from the bottom up.
Redistricting—the state practice that may have the most direct
effect on the composition of the national government—exhibits
notable differences among the States. A slight majority of states
leave redistricting in the control of the state legislature, although
Iowa takes exceptional measures to cleanse the legislature’s process of partisanship through legislative staff analysis of plans.
Twenty-one states rely on some form of redistricting commission, though these commissions vary in independence.167 In thirteen states, a commission has primary authority for drawing up
161. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“The Number of Representatives shall not exceed
one for every thirty Thousand.”).
162. See Number of Legislators and Length of Terms in Years, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-statelegislatures/statewide-votes-on-term-limits.aspx [http://perma.cc/57SD-BJSM].
163. THE BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 153, at 164–65 (Table 4.9), available at
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/4.9%202014.pdf
[http://perma.cc/F8EK -CHHM].
164. Statewide Votes on Term Limits, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Mar.
25, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/statewide-voteson-term-limits.aspx [http://perma.cc/GZL8-CRYG].
165. THE BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 153, at 164–65 (Table 4.9), available at
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/4.9%202014.pdf
[http://perma.cc/F8EK -CHHM].
166. The Term-Limited States, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Mar. 13,
2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/chart-of-term-limitsstates.aspx [http://perma.cc/PNB4-LD6S].
167. Redistricting Commissions: Legislative Plans, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES
(June
27,
2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/2009redistricting-commissions-table.aspx [http://perma.cc/SJW3-4NXW].
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the redistricting plan. In three states, a commission has advisory
authority only. In five states, a commission serves as a backup in
the event the legislature is unable to finalize a plan. Eight states
form their redistricting commissions by legislative appointment,168 and eight more rely on mixed appointments by the executive branch or a combination of executive, legislative, and
judicial branches or state party leaders.169 Four states form commissions from executive branch officials, and two include legislative leadership.170 One, California, uses a citizens’ redistricting
commission chosen by lottery. 171 Most states rely on singlemember districts after a slow decline of multi-member districts
in the wake of the reapportionment revolution and subsequent
voting rights litigation.172 Yet, ten states continue to use multimember districts, ranging from two to eleven representatives
each, in one or both houses of the state legislature.173
3.

Parties

Party regulation provides both an opportunity for variation
among states and additional opportunities for innovations by
individual parties within states. Nominating conventions are
permitted for major and minor parties in twenty-two states.174
168. Id. (Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Montana, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington.).
169. Id. (Arkansas, Colorado, Missouri, Ohio, and Vermont rely on government
officers. Idaho, Maine, and New Jersey rely in whole or in part on political party
officers.).
170. Id. (Arkansas and Oklahoma include only executive branch officers; Mississippi and Texas add legislative leadership.).
171. Id.
172. Karl Kurtz, Declining Use of Multi-Member Districts, THE THICKET AT STATE
LEGISLATURES (July 13, 2011), http://ncsl.typepad.com/the_thicket/2011/07/thedecline-in-multi-member-districts.html [http://perma.cc/MUJ9-MX5Q]; see also
Josh Goodman, The Disappearance of Multi-Member Constituencies, GOVERNING THE
STATES AND LOCALITIES (July 7, 2011), http://www.governing.com/blogs/
politics/The-Disappearance-of-Multi-Member-Constituencies.html
[http://perma.cc/AK3F-CABU].
173. Karl Kurtz, Changes in Legislatures Using Multimember Districts after Redistricting, THE THICKET AT STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 11, 2012),
http://ncsl.typepad.com/the_thicket/2012/09/a-slight-decline-in-legislatures-usingmultimember-districts-after-redistricting.html [http://perma.cc/8CN6-LJ4Y].
174. THE BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 149, at 277–78 (Table 6.3), available at
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/6.3%202014.pdf [http://perma.cc/
X5N9-MLWV].
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These conventions, which act like small-scale primaries, can
serve as a testing ground for new voting methods, such as voting by mail, internet voting, and instant runoff voting.175 Eleven
states hold open primaries, eleven states hold closed primaries,
four states (including Nebraska’s nonpartisan legislature) hold
top-two primaries, and the remaining states hold some combination of primaries.176 Most states use a plurality rule, but eleven states hold runoff elections for various offices.177 Primaries
exert their strongest disciplining effect in the forty-seven states
that have some sort of sore loser laws; these laws spread relatively recently through the states between 1976 and 1994. 178
Meanwhile, state voter registration laws and a variety of polling place affiliation processes can strengthen or weaken parties’ control of membership and the extent to which the parties
can effectively close their own primaries.179 As of 2014, thirty
states provided for party affiliation in voter registration. Affiliations range from 51% and 65% Republican (Kansas and Wyoming, respectively) to 54% and 55% Democrat (Kentucky and
Maryland, respectively).180 Unaffiliated voters vary more widely, ranging from 8% in Kentucky to 92% in Arkansas. In the

175. The Canvass: States and Election Reform, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES
(May
2011),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/cnv-thecanvass-vol-xx-may-2011.aspx [http://perma.cc/9TUF-UMWS].
176. State Primary Election Types, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 24,
2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/primary-types.aspx
[http://perma.cc/7LXZ-GZ7S].
177 . Primary Runoffs, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 12, 2014),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/primary-runoffs.aspx
[http://perma.cc/ZM8P-NTEP].
178. Michael S. Kang, Sore Loser Laws and Democratic Contestation, 99 GEO. L.J.
1013, 1043 (2011) (arguing for “supply side” reform of political parties, including
repeal of sore loser laws, to reduce polarization by increasing intraparty contestation and compromise).
179. See Renée Paradis, Party Affiliation in a System of Automatic Voter RegistraCTR.
FOR
JUSTICE
(2009),
http://brennan.3cdn.net/
tion,
BRENNAN
20f072ddef43a7d2f5_bgm6ii9s9.pdf [http://perma.cc/TW2F-T2MY].
180. Mark Blumenthal & Ariel Edwards-Levy, HUFFPOLLSTER: A State-ByState Guide to Party Registration, HUFFINGTON POST (May 27, 2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/27/state-party-registration_n_
5399977.html [http://perma.cc/C7JE-8GCC].

452

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 39

1990s, twenty states offered straight-ticket voting, but only ten
do now.181
Given the Supreme Court’s recognition of political parties’
expressive association rights, state primary law often serves as
only a default option subject to modification by individual parties. In ten states (Alaska, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Nebraska,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington), one party chooses to operate its primary differently from
how the other party operates its primary. 182 Notably, in all
these states but one the Republican Party opts for closed primaries while the Democratic Party opts for a more open option;
only in blue Hawaii does the Democratic Party close its primary while the Republicans keep theirs open.183 These choices by
party organizations, as well as legislation by the party in office,
both track and shape the party dynamics within each state,
with sometimes surprising divergences between the two. In
one recent example, Idaho’s Republican Party sued its standard-bearer Secretary of State Ben Ysursa. In the case, the Party
succeeded in persuading a federal court to implement, under
the First Amendment, a party closed-primary rule that its legislative supermajorities would not enact.184 A Republican legislator in neighboring Montana also sued to close that state’s primaries, with the support of the state party organization but not
all of the Republican state legislators.185 However, in Hawaii, a
Democratic version of the Idaho strategy has so far been un-

181. Straight Ticket Voting States, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (July 16,
2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/straight-ticketvoting.aspx [http://perma.cc/LPM3-E649].
182. Congressional and Presidential Primaries: Open, Closed, Semi-Closed, and Others,
CTR. FOR VOTING & DEMOCRACY (July 2015), http://www.fairvote.org/researchand-analysis/presidential-elections/congressional-and-presidential-primariesopen-closed-semi-closed-and-top-two/ [http://perma.cc/58AS-M9AF].
183. Id.
184. See Idaho Republican Party v. Ysursa, 765 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (D. Idaho 2011).
But see Greenville Cty. Republican Party Exec. Comm. v. S. Carolina, 824 F. Supp.
2d 655 (D.S.C. 2011) (rejecting state party’s suit to invalidate open primary).
185. Michael Wright, Montana Republicans Divided Over Open Primaries, MONT.
PUB. RADIO (Mar. 18, 2015), http://mtpr.org/post/montana-republicans-dividedover-open-primaries [http://perma.cc/KL9X-DQNG].
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successful in voiding that state’s constitutional requirement for
an open primary.186
4.

Campaign Finance

Perhaps the widest variation among state election law regimes
appears in campaign finance law. Although most prominent
discussions about campaign finance concern federal Super PACs
and 501(c)(4) organizations, most campaign financing is conducted under state law for state elections. During the last major
gubernatorial cycle in 2014, in which thirty-four of the fifty states
held elections for governor, state candidates and committees (including ballot issue committees) raised $3.2 billion—a conservative estimate that excludes some independent expenditures and
electioneering.187 Despite these exclusions, and the fact that onethird of the States did not hold top-tier elections that year, the
figure is still close to the nearly $3.6 billion in contributions to
the 2012 federal presidential and congressional campaigns. 188
Over the most recent completed four-year cycle of 2011-2014,
state campaign contributions amounted to nearly $7 billion,189
outpacing estimated total federal campaign contributions of
nearly $6.4 billion that same cycle.190 State campaign finance and
campaign finance law matter.
States are evenly split in their choices of campaign finance
rules. Individual contribution limits for 2015–2016 range from
approximately $50,000 in New York to $500 in Alaska (for governor) and $12,532 in Ohio to $170 in Montana (for state legislature, per election).191 Twelve states allow unlimited individual
186. See Democratic Party of Haw. v. Nago, 982 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Haw. 2013),
appeal pending No. 13-17545 (9th Cir. filed Dec. 13, 2013).
187. National Overview: State-Level Giving Trends (2014), FOLLOW THE MONEY,
http://followthemoney.org/national-overview (last updated Mar. 14, 2016).
188. National Overview: Federal-Level Giving Trends (2012), FOLLOW THE MONEY,
http://followthemoney.org/national-overview (last updated Mar. 14, 2016).
189. Contributions to candidates and committess in elections in 2014, 2013, 2012,
2011, FOLLOW THE MONEY, http://www.followthemoney.org/show-me?y=2014,
2013,2012,2011&f-core=1 [http://perma.cc/TV29-MSJ9] (last updated Mar. 14,
2016).
190. Contributions to candidates and committees in elections in 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011
(within federal data), FOLLOW THE MONEY, http://followthemoney.org/showme?y=2015,2014,2013,2012&f-core=1&f-fc=1 (last updated Mar. 14, 2016).
191. State Limits on Contributions to Candidates: 2015–2016 Election Cycle, NAT’L
CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 28, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/
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contributions.192 Twenty-two states prohibit corporate contributions to candidates, while six allow unlimited corporate contributions.193 Five states (Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and West Virginia) permit union contributions while
prohibiting corporate contributions, while New Hampshire
prohibits union contributions while permitting corporate contributions.194 Twenty-eight states limit state party contributions
to candidates, but those limits range from the same few hundred or few thousand dollars as individual limits to hundreds
of thousands of dollars (per election) or more than a million
dollars per cycle.195 In addition to the three fully funded campaign “clean election” states (Arizona, Connecticut, and
Maine), ten other states offer other public financing programs
for some or all state offices.196 Beyond these highlights, there
are innumerable other distinctions in regulation of coordination rules, electioneering expenditures, attribution, and so on.
In an era where many campaigns abandon the traditional political committee form, state corporate law adds a new layer of
complexity to both state and federal campaigns.197
All fifty states require candidate contribution disclosure,
though reporting periods range from monthly throughout an
election year, weekly and daily as the election approaches (Alabama and Arkansas), to once per primary and general election
(Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Wisconsin,

Portals/1/documents/legismgt/elect/ContributionLimitstoCandidates20152016.pdf [http://perma.cc/AZQ8-9E9F].
192. Id. (Alabama, Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Virginia).
193. Id. (Alabama, Missouri, Nebraska, Oregon, Utah, and Virginia).
194. Id. New Hampshire’s corporate contribution prohibition was invalidated
by a federal court in 1999. Id. In 2015, Montana amended its contribution prohibition to include unions. See An Act Generally Revising Campaign Finance Laws,
§ 4, S.B. 289, 64th Mont. Leg. Sess. (2015).
195. State Limits on Contributions to Candidates, supra note 191.
196. State Public Financing Options: 2015–2016 Election Cycle, NAT’L CONF. OF
STATE LEGISLATURES (July 17, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/
legismgt/elect/StatePublicFinancingOptionsChart2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/E2L7B6PE].
197. See, e.g., Michael Beckel, Why is an Obscure Montana Company One of John
Kasich’s Biggest Boosters?, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (July 30, 2015),
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/07/30/17733/why-obscure-montanacompany-one-john-kasichs-biggest-boosters [http://perma.cc/GCS3-8LSC].
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and Wyoming), sometimes with a post-election report. 198 A
quarter of states do not require regular reports from political
action committees.199 Most states now require some form of independent expenditure disclosure from groups other than registered political committees, with triggers ranging from zerodollar disclosure (Alaska, Georgia, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Tennessee, and Wyoming) to $5,000 (Arizona, Florida,
and Oklahoma) and $10,000 per four-year cycle in Maryland.200
In setting disclosure thresholds for individual contributions,
many states gravitate toward the $100 level regardless of electorate or campaign size.201 Thresholds range from “zero-dollar”
disclosure of the name and address of any campaign contributor in Florida, Michigan, and New Mexico regardless of contribution amount,202 to a $300 contribution disclosure threshold in
New Jersey and $200 threshold in Mississippi, North Dakota,
and West Virginia.203
A subtler but critical legal distinction is enforcement of campaign finance and related laws. Again, there is no dominant
practice in the States, neither in terms of methodology or efficacy. Robert Huckshorn studied state campaign finance enforcement in the 1980s and concluded that, of the 26 states with
election commissions at the time, there were two distinct
groups: “(1) those which are empowered to enforce the law,
but, for one reason or another, have an established history of
limited enforcement or nonenforcement; and (2) those commissions possessing powers of enforcement which exercise them

198 . State Campaign Finance Disclosure Requirements: 2015-2016 Election Cycle,
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (July 17, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/
Portals/1/documents/legismgt/elect/StateCampaignFinanceDisclosure
RequirementsChart2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/P4F9-9BZW].
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See Independent Expenditure: Does the state require disclosure of independent
expenditures?, THE CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE LAW DATABASE, available at
http://disclosure.law.ucla.edu/default.aspx [http://perma.cc/X8FV-DTKG] (last
updated Dec. 31, 2006).
202 . FLA. STAT. § 106.07(4)(a)(1) (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 169.226(1)(e)
(2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19-31(A)(3) (2007).
203. MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-807(d)(ii) (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-16(f)
(2015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-02(2) (2013); W. VA. CODE § 3-8-5(a) (2009).
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on a regular basis.”204 Two decades later, Todd Lochner studied
education, auditing, and penalty enforcement of state campaign finance agencies and still found significant variation.205
More recently, often obscure appointed state campaign practices commissions have shared the spotlight with aggressive enforcement of disclosure law by elected state attorneys general
who possess broad supervisory powers over nonprofit organizations.206 Beyond law enforcement, other state officials may be
responsible for—and more or less effective at—ensuring campaign finance and related reports are disclosed to the public.
5.

Other Factors

After Election Day, many other factors interact with election
law to influence the form of a state’s republicanism. Are the
legislators full-time or part-time?207 How often do they meet?
What are their salaries? What professional staff is available?
How open are meetings? How public are documents? How is
lobbying defined? How is it regulated? How strict or loose are
204. Robert J. Huckshorn, Who Gave It? Who Got It?: The Enforcement of Campaign
Finance Laws in the States, 47 J. POL. 773, 779 (1985).
205. Todd Lochner, Surveying the Landscape of State Campaign Finance Enforcement: A Preliminary Analysis, 4 ELECTION L. J. 329 (2005).
206. See Press Release, Cal. Dep’t. of Justice, Office of the Attorney General Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Announces $1 Million Civil
Settlement for Campaign Finance Violations, Calls for Legislative Reform (Oct. 24,
2013), available at https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamalad-harris-announces-1-million-civil-settlement-campaign [http://perma.cc/QY4F3TYX] (announcing California Attorney General’s joint settlement, with the California Fair Political Practices Commission, of campaign finance disclosure prosecution); Maura Dolan, California charities must disclose major donors, court rules, L.A.
TIMES (May 1, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-charity-court20150501-story.html [http://perma.cc/CMV6-C2SN] (reporting on California Attorney General’s pursuit of donor records for Center for Competitive Politics under state nonprofit law); Jonathan Stempel, Citizens United loses New York ruling
over donors, REUTERS (July 27, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/uscitizensunited-new-york-lawsuit-idUSKCN0Q11YA20150727
[http://perma.cc/
XR3H-BP8M] (reporting on New York Attorney General’s pursuit of donor records for Citizens United under state nonprofit law).
207. For example, the most-populous states tend to have full-time legislatures,
but so does Alaska; the least-populous states tend to have part-time legislatures,
but so do Georgia and Utah; about half of states fall in between. See Full- and PartTime Legislatures, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 1, 2014),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/full-and-part-timelegislatures.aspx [http://perma.cc/VEM2-CKJG].
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ethics laws? How does the state regulate procurement? What
kind of civil service and whistleblower protections are there?
Who enforces state ethics and lobbying laws? How engaged
with state government are federal and state anti-corruption law
enforcers? These questions are the building blocks of perennial
state report cards on ethics and corruption. The inconsistency
of state “grades” across reports suggests how complicated each
state’s political culture may be.208 For example, a recent comprehensive study of state public integrity laws ranked New Jersey and Illinois in the top ten and the Dakotas near the bottom,
in part because states with a history of corruption are more
likely to legislate on public integrity while in smaller states
“libertarian[] roots, a small-town, neighborly approach to government and the honest belief that ‘everybody knows everybody’ has overridden any perceived need for strong protections in law.”209 These studies necessarily reflect the subjective
judgments of their authors, and only begin to capture the complexity of a state’s resulting political culture.
B.

Rules, Regimes, and Systems of Republicanism

There are sharp and persistent distinctions among the individual rules that structure state forms of republicanism and
similarly sharp and persistent distinctions between those state
rules and the rules that structure our national republicanism.
By and large, the distinctions cut across big and small states,
urban and rural states, and red and blue states. They represent
the accretion of decades, and in some cases centuries, of consti208. Compare State Integrity Investigation, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, available at
http://www.publicintegrity.org/accountability/state-integrity-investigation/
[http://perma.cc/5JQR-S7TB] (last visited Nov. 17, 2015) (ranking reporters’ summaries of state public-integrity laws, their efficacy, and citizen access to using
those laws) with Oguzhan Dincer & Michael Johnston, Measuring Illegal and Legal
Corruption in American States: Some Results from the Corruption in America Survey,
HARVARD UNIV. EDMOND J. SAFRA CTR. FOR ETHICS (Dec. 1, 2014),
http://ethics.harvard.edu/blog/measuring-illegal-and-legal-corruption-americanstates-some-results-safra [http://perma.cc/Y747-2RXM] (ranking reporters’ perception of illegal and legal corruption in each of the three branches of state governments).
209. Caitlin Ginley, Grading the nation: How accountable is your state?, CTR. FOR
PUB.
INTEGRITY
(March
19,
2012),
http://www.publicintegrity.org/
2012/03/19/8423/grading-nation-how-accountable-your-state
[http://perma.cc/EH6G-YDY4].
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tutional and statutory traditions and adaptations. While waves
of national political or legal reforms sometimes introduce new
rules, some states lead those reforms, some states follow, and
other states resist or retrench after a time. These distinctions
extend beyond just a few outlier states. Across an array of rule
choices, states either spread out across the continuum of potential rules, or divide into two or three relatively evenly sized
camps. Despite recent trends toward the nationalization of
state politics, and accounting for the recognition of basic political equality, state republicanisms are as diverse as ever.
These distinct rules alone complicate any attempt to characterize state republicanism. Such variation has facilitated a developing political science literature about the impact of particular
rules on various republican values. Any summary citation
would be incomplete, though Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Eric M.
McGhee, and Steven Rogers assemble many of the recent findings in their comprehensive analysis of the effect of electoral
rules on representation and the other questions that arise from
the study of republican pluralism in the States.210 Rule-level effects, when they exist, run in the low single-digit percentages.
Yet as the discussion above suggests, the function of republicanism in the States is multivariate. Each state develops its own regime of rules to govern any particular element of election law.
These regimes can produce interaction effects that aggravate or
mitigate the impact of the component rules. Republican pluralism attends to the variation among state systems that cannot be
explained by changes in a single rule or even a single regime.
In election administration, some states may pair early voting
with strict voter identification requirements, while others limit
early voting but provide a relatively convenient process at the
polls. In legislative composition, states may reduce the impact
of turnover from term limits with small houses that facilitate
trust among members or incumbent-protective redistricting
processes, while others may increase that impact with larger
houses and a more competitive redistricting process. Political
parties may be able to elect purer candidates in states that
combine closed primaries, party affiliation in voter registration,
210. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Eric M. McGhee, & Steven Rogers, The Realities of Electoral Reform, 68 VAND. L. REV. 761, 772–77 (2015).
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plurality rules, and sore loser laws than in states that lack one
or more of those rules. In campaign finance, states may concentrate fundraising on candidate campaigns by combining high
candidate contribution limits with strong enforcement of independent expenditure disclosure, or divert campaign contributions into undisclosed expenditures by adopting the opposite
regime.211 Public integrity factors like lobbying regulation, ethics rules, and transparency can work in combination to foster a
culture of integrity, or undercut it.
At the state level, multiple regimes form a system that interacts with factors like demographics, economics, and geography
to constitute a state’s republican form of government. Consider,
for example, the system of interactions between a state’s party
regulation regime and its campaign finance regime. The regimes
may complement each other to increase party control of candidates in a system of closed primaries, high contribution limits
for parties, and strong regulation of independent expenditures.
They may also complement each other to decrease party control
with open primaries, low contribution limits for parties, and unregulated independent expenditures. Some mix of regimes may
produce a system that exacerbates polarization, perhaps with
closed primaries and low contribution limits, but unregulated
independent expenditures, or fosters moderation, perhaps with
open primaries and unlimited contributions to candidates or
parties that dry up independent expenditures. Neither party
regulation nor campaign finance regimes alone are likely to accomplish their individual purposes without being amplified or
undercut by interactions of the system.
Now, add the election administration regime to the mix.
Something as simple as the election calendar can determine the
amount of money a candidate may need to raise—more for a
nine-month general campaign and less for a two-month general campaign. Early voting and voting by mail, on the other
hand, can shorten the election calendar by weeks at its most
critical stage, shifting a party’s get-out-the-vote efforts while
potentially mooting some campaign finance disclosure deadlines that fall after the most informed voters have cast their bal211. See Anthony Johnstone, The System of Campaign Finance Disclosure, 989 IOWA
L. REV. BULL. 143 (2014).
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lots. Whether state or local elections are on or off the presidential cycle may determine how large or small the primary electorate is for top-tier offices and how much the general electorate will discipline potentially polarized primary choices.
Add redistricting, and the system changes again. In states with
legislative control of redistricting, a post-census election exerts
a powerful draw for outside money as national parties seek to
line up favorable districts for Congressional seats, which may
impose new disciplining forces on party candidates at campaigns. The same may be true for top election officials like Secretaries of State in swing states. Add public integrity laws, and
the efficacy of such outside influence might increase or decrease depending on lobbying regulations or open meeting
laws. And so on.
C.

The Persistence of State Political Cultures

States continue to exhibit distinct identities, manifest in their
political cultures and linked to the institutional structure of a
state rather than regional or local factors.212 A state’s political culture is a function of these rules, regimes, and systems, interacting with non-legal realities like demographics, economics, and
geography. State political culture is the inertia that slows onesize-fits-all reform efforts. It is the reason why changing any one
212. See Ernest A. Young, The Volk of New Jersey? State Identity, Distinctiveness,
and Political Culture in the American Federal System (Duke Law Sch. Pub. Law &
Legal Series, No. 2015-11, Feb. 24, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2552866
[http://perma.cc/3FUS-6R9K] (drawing on work by Daniel Elazar, Andrew Gelman, and others to answer “yes” to the question of “whether contemporary
Americans understand themselves as sufficiently attached to their state political
communities for that attachment to make a difference in decisions that affect the
federal structure”); Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Political Institutions and Policy
Choices: Evidence from the United States, 41 J. ECON. LIT. 7, 22 (March 2003) (“Overall, it is clear that there is interesting institutional, political, and economic variation in the U.S. states, both across space and time,” and finding that political institutional variations affect political outcomes). For a contemporary example of how
the persistent distinctions among state political cultures itself serves as a shield for
the Union, see Ross Douthat, The Party Still Decides, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2016, at
SR9 (arguing that the provincialism of state-level politics provides a necessary
check on mass democracy, by “confronting would-be demagogues with complicated ballot requirements, insisting that a potential Coriolanus or a Sulla count
delegates in Guam and South Dakota, asking men who aspire to awesome power
to submit to the veto of state chairmen and local newspapers, the town meeting
and the caucus hall.”).
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rule, no matter how radical or enlightened, barely moves the
needle in transforming a state’s republicanism. Across the board,
a national rule, regime, or system of election law might nudge
each state republicanism a little more toward participation,
competition, equality, or representation on its own scale. But political culture ensures that no reform will make State A as participatory, equal, competitive, or representative as State B. Comparisons of money in politics, state voting turnout, electoral
contestation, and policy alignment demonstrate the dominance
of political culture in state republicanisms.
1.

Participation and Voting Turnout

The average turnout from the voting-eligible population recently hovers around 57% in recent presidential elections and
39% in midterm elections, though this conceals a 30-point range
among the states.213 A voter would be about 50% more likely to
cast a vote come November in chilly Minnesota or Maine than in
warmer Hawaii or Texas.214 Distinctions persist among neighboring states; Ohioans turn out more than ten percentage points
more than West Virginians, and Coloradans turn out an average
of fourteen percentage points more than Arizonans.215 In 2012,
black voters generally voted at higher rates than white voters in
the eastern third of the United States, particularly in the Mid213. See Michael P. McDonald, National General Election VEP Turnout Rates, 1789Present,
U.S.
ELECTIONS
PROJECT
(June
11,
2014),
http://www.electproject.org/national-1789-present
[http://perma.cc/3PHJ-47TB]
(average national presidential and midterm turnout of voter-eligible population
from 1992–2014).
214. Michael P. McDonald, State General Election Turnout Rates, 1980-2014, U.S.
ELECTIONS PROJECT (2015), http://www.electproject.org/home/voter-turnout/voterturnout/data [http://perma.cc/Q2J6-QnQ2] (showing average state presidential
and midterm turnout of voter-eligible population from 1992–2014). Between 1992
and 2014, Minnesota averaged 57% in midterms (a gubernatorial year) and 74% in
presidential years; Maine averaged 54% in midterms (a gubernatorial year) and
70% in presidential years; Hawaii averaged 43% in midterms (a gubernatorial
year) and 47% in presidential years; Texas (using highest office vote total instead
of total ballots counted) averaged 32% in midterms (a gubernatorial year) and
51% in presidential years. Id.
215. Id. Between 1992 and 2014, Ohio averaged 43% in midterms (a gubernatorial year) and 63% in presidential years; West Virginia averaged 33% in midterms
and 51% in presidential years (a gubernatorial year); Colorado averaged 49% in
midterms (a gubernatorial year) and 68% in presidential years; Arizona averaged
37% in midterms (a gubernatorial year) and 52% in presidential years. Id.
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Atlantic and East South Central states, and at lower rates than
white voters in the western third, particularly in the Mountain
West.216 Non-Hispanic White voters generally voted at substantially higher rates than Hispanic voters, but the discrepancy was
at least twenty percentage points in Central states, but less than
ten points along most of the East Coast.217 Remarkably, the variation in voter turnout among states today may be greater than the
historical variation in national voter turnout (among the increasing voting-eligible population) throughout the entire twentieth
century.218 This interstate variation overwhelms any impact on
turnout of voter ID, early voting, same-day registration, or any
other single voting rule.
A second degree of variation arises beyond the biennial
Tuesday after the first Monday in November. Participation in
primary elections varies by a factor of two. Even in the 2008
presidential campaign for an open seat, and setting aside New
Hampshire’s 54% primary turnout, participation ranged from
40% or more (Oregon, Ohio, Vermont, and California) to 20%
or less (Michigan, New York, Louisiana, and Republican primaries in New Mexico and Idaho), nearing the 16% participation rate for Iowa’s presidential caucuses.219 This analysis considers only state and federal general elections. In local
elections, turnout averages as low as 26% for city mayoral races, with turnout as much as 15 to 27 points lower for elections
that do not coincide with midterm and presidential elections,
respectively, than for elections that do coincide with federal
elections.220 In many urban centers, few voting rights remedies
216. THOM FILE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE DIVERSIFYING ELECTORATE—VOTING
RATES BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN IN 2012 (AND OTHER RECENT ELECTIONS) 9
(2013),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p20-568.pdf
[http://perma.cc/4FU9-NXT4].
217. Id. at 10.
218. McDonald, supra note 214 (between 1900 and 2014, the range of turnout
was between 49% (1924) to 74% (1900) in presidential years, and 33% (1926) to
56% (1902) in midterms).
219. Michael P. McDonald, 2008 Presidential Nomination Contest Turnout Rates,
U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT (Oct. 10, 2008), http://www.electproject.org/2008p
[http://perma.cc/8RC4-WFN4].
220. Thomas M. Holbrook & Aaron C. Weinschenk, Campaigns, Mobilization, and
Turnout in Mayoral Elections, 67 POL. RES. Q. 42, 51 (2014). See generally SARAH F.
ANZIA, TIMING AND TURNOUT: HOW OFF-CYCLE ELECTIONS FAVOR ORGANIZED
GROUPS (2014).
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would have as powerful an effect as simply moving local elections to coincide with state and federal elections.
2.

Equality and Campaign Finance

Beyond the core of basic political equality in voting rights, the
most contested arena of equality values in election law is campaign finance, and in particular the relative influence of wealthy
donors on campaigns. For better or for worse, the amount of
money in at-large state campaigns is comparable to federal Senate
campaigns, despite the massive infusions of national campaign
funding into Senate campaigns, particularly in “cheap seats” from
smaller states. One study of Senate campaigns from 2010 to 2014
found the median candidate and independent spending per race
to be $7 per capita, but among the most competitive races the
spending varied widely from Alaska’s $121 per voter in 2014 and
Montana’s $67 per voter in 2012 to around $15 to $17 per voter in
North Carolina (2014), Virginia (2012), Massachusetts (2012), and
Colorado (2010).221 These bear a striking resemblance to the varying cost of campaigns by state found by Louise Overacker’s pioneering study of campaign finance. In the 1928 presidential campaign, “[t]he cost of Democratic votes ranged from $4.46 in
Nevada [about $60 in 2012 dollars] to nothing at all in Maine and
Vermont, while the Republicans spent $1.75 per voter in Arizona
[about $24 in 2012 dollars] and $0.03 per voter in Maine [about
$0.40 in 2012 dollars].”222 The median amount spent in states by
each presidential campaign was about $0.50 per voter in 1928
(about $6.70 in 2012 dollars).223
Comparable campaign finance figures for state races are
more difficult to determine. In 2014 state campaigns with governors’ races, estimated per voter television campaign advertisement spending alone ranged from $10 or more (in Rhode
Island, Connecticut, and Illinois) to $2 or less (in Vermont,

221. Grace Wallack & John Hudak, How Much Did Your Vote Cost? Spending Per
Voter in the 2014 Senate Races, BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 7, 2014),
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2014/11/07-spending-per-voter2014-midterm-senate-wallack-hudak [http://perma.cc/NX6b-WX4M].
222. LOUISE OVERACKER, MONEY IN ELECTIONS 77 (1932).
223. Id. at 75–76.
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South Dakota, California, Tennessee, and Oregon).224 The mix
of campaign spending changes dramatically from state to state.
The dominant funding sources for television campaigns included 68% independent expenditures in Kansas, 72% party
funds in Florida, and 100% candidate campaign expenditures
in Vermont and South Dakota (and 99% in Texas).225 Widening
the scope to all candidate fundraising, but still excluding independent expenditures, a recent study found aggregate contributions per voter of between $0.81 and $17.75 over the period
of 2003 through 2010.226
A synthesis of both participation and equality values, participation in campaign finance varies by an order of magnitude
from state to state. In the most recent gubernatorial election
years on record, the top five states (Vermont in 2010, Rhode Island in 2010, Montana in 2012, Hawaii in 2010, and Massachusetts in 2010) boasted per capita campaign contribution rates of
between 3.5% and 5.9% of voting age population, while the bottom five states (Florida in 2010, California in 2010, Utah in 2012
and 2010, New York in 2010, and Nevada in 2010) lagged with
participation rates of just 0.2% to 0.6%.227 The donor mix varies
widely too. Large contributions (over $1000 and PACs) account
for more than 80% of candidate fundraising in Georgia, Mis224. Chris Zubak-Skees, State ad wars tracker, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 2,
2015),
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/09/22/15623/state-ad-wars-tracker
[http://perma.cc/TBV4-QW2P].
225. Id.
226. Brian E. Adams, Determinants of Aggregate Campaign Fundraising in State
Legislative
Elections
(APSA
2014
Annual
Meeting
Paper,
2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2455034 [http://perma.cc/GX5T-3WT7].
227. Press Release, Campaign Finance Institute, Previewing 2014: CFI Releases
Analysis of Money in State Elections (Oct. 30, 2014), available at
http://cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/14-10-30/CFI_Releases_Analysis_of_
Money_in_State_Elections.aspx [http://perma.cc/7LSG-ZQKB]; Press Release,
Campaign Finance Institute, Vermont and Rhode Island Had the Highest Percentages of Adults Contributing in 2010 and 2006 State Elections; New York, Utah,
California and Florida the Lowest (Dec. 20, 2012), available at
http://cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-12-20/VT_and_RI_Had_the_Highest_
Percentages_of_Adults_Contributing_in_2010_and_2006_State_Elections_NY_
UT_CA_and_FL_the_Lowest.aspx [http://perma.cc/G5Q7-2KMF]. Excluded from
these studies are two states (New Jersey and Virginia) that have post-presidential
off-year gubernatorial elections (most recently in 2013), and three states (Kentucky, Louisiana, and Mississippi) that have pre-presidential off-year gubernatorial elections (most recently in 2015).

No. 2]

Federalist Safeguards of Politics

465

souri, Utah, Texas, and Nevada.228 Small contributions ($250 or
less) account for the majority of funding in Connecticut and
Minnesota, and more than 40% of funding in Wisconsin, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Maine, Arizona, and Montana.229
3.

Competition and Contested Races

Electoral competition is an elusive thing to measure, and
may be even harder to promote. Looking to campaign finance
data, and excluding the three “clean elections” states with full
public funding (Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine), the top five
most competitive states in 2011 and 2012 state legislative races
(New Hampshire, Minnesota, Alaska, South Dakota, and North
Dakota) had runners-up who raised at least half of the winning
candidate in one-third to two-thirds of the seats.230 The eight
least competitive states (Georgia, Texas, Florida, Wyoming,
South Carolina, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Missouri) had
ten percent or fewer seats that rated competitive by that measure.231 Other indices comparing open seats, primary contests,
and major party competition in state legislative races find similar variations in incumbency turnover,232 open seats,233 contested primaries,234 and major-party contested general elections. 235
228. Previewing 2014: CFI Releases Analyses of Money in State Elections, supra
note 227.
229. Id.
230. Zach Holden & Gus Voss, Monetary Competitiveness in 2011 and 2012 State
Legislative Races, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POLITICS (Dec. 23, 2014),
http://followthemoney.org/research/institute-reports/the-role-of-monetarycompetitiveness-in-2011-and-2012-state-legislative-races/ [http://perma.cc/63MG969U].
231. Id.
232 . State Legislative Incumbent Turnover in 2014, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/State_legislative_incumbent_turnover_in_2014
[http://perma.cc/
HL25-LPJN] (last visited Nov. 14, 2015) (reporting that 2014 incumbent turnover
ranged from less than 10% in Delaware, Rhode Island, Indiana, South Carolina,
and Georgia to 30% or more in California, Arizona, Michigan, Montana, and Nebraska).
233 . Comparing the Competitiveness Index for State Legislative Elections, BALhttp://ballotpedia.org/Comparing_the_competitiveness_index_for_
LOTPEDIA,
state_legislative_elections [http://perma.cc/AX3T-EHC7] (last visited Nov. 14,
2015) (reporting that 2014 open seats ranged from 4% of seats in Delaware to 38%
in Montana and 68% in Nebraska).
234. Id. (2014 contested primaries ranged from 2% of seats in Maine to 67% in
Maryland).
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Representation and Policy Alignment

Another basic but elusive value is representation in terms of
alignment between elected officials and constituents. At first
glance, alignment appears to be an unimpeachable republican
value, since republicanism is in, Madison’s terms, simply “a
government in which the scheme of representation takes
place.”236 But as with all republican values there are tradeoffs,
and even for Madison, simple alignment in terms of majority
rule is suspect. Any political community might reasonably
prefer to weigh other values more heavily, such as broadbased and sustained participation in politics, equal opportunity for influence, or competition that fosters debate and refinement of policies. Representation itself takes different
forms, depending on whether the relevant representation occurs at the level of the elected official, the representative
body, or enacted policy. A state that places representation
above all other values may have difficulty knowing how well
it is achieving it.
Fortunately, political science has taken major strides in
measuring and analyzing representation in terms of alignment
at the state level. Consistent with distinct and persistent republican pluralism in the States, Stephanopoulos, McGhee, and
Rogers find “both alignment and responsiveness vary markedly from state to state, but not very much from year to year,”
over a period of more than two decades.237 Legislatures in Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, and Tennessee align well with their
electorates, while California and Connecticut lean to the left
and those in Ohio and Michigan lean to the right.238 Of those
state legislatures, however, Michigan and Tennessee are highly
responsive to changes in the state electorate’s preferences, Delaware is moderately responsive; California, Idaho, and Ohio
are nonresponsive; and Georgia appears to move against shifts
in its electorate despite its good alignment.239 Another study of
235. Id. (2014 major-party contested general elections ranged from 20% of seats
in Georgia to 100% in Michigan).
236. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 133 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright, ed.,
1961).
237. Stephanopoulos, McGhee & Rogers, supra note 210, at 765.
238. Id. at 800.
239. Id.
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alignment of policy outcomes with state public opinion found
the highest congruence in California and Louisiana (69%) and
the lowest in New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, West Virginia,
and Wyoming (33%).240
IV.

THE FEDERALIST SAFEGUARDS OF POLITICS

If the judicial, legislative, and executive branches of the federal government are unlikely to make further significant progress in guaranteeing a republican form of government—
however conceived—they should step aside and encourage the
States to step in. National political gridlock, even if only transitional, presents an opportunity for each state to refine republicanism in response to the changing landscape of politics as
each state experiences it.241 More than this, it presents an opportunity for states to play a role in breaking the national political
gridlock. American federalism has been described as a series of
popular movements entrusting the federal or state governments with more or less confidence as the times demand,242 and
Americans now have historically low levels of confidence in
the federal government.243 The means of devolution are clear
enough in the federal and state constitutions, though are admittedly less clear in politics.244 The end itself is an opportunity
to reconceive state republicanism and perhaps to recompose
national republicanism in the diverse image of the state republics that compose the Union.

240. Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, The Democratic Deficit in the States, 56 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 148, 152–53 (2012).
241. See Franita Tolson, The Union As A Safeguard Against Faction: Congressional
Gridlock as State Empowerment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2267 (2013).
242. Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 286 (2000).
243. Justin McCarthy, Confidence in U.S. Branches of Government Remains Low,
GALLUP (June 15, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/183605/confidence-branchesgovernment-remains-low.aspx [http://perma.cc/ATQ2-783K].
244. William Marshall recognized a political opportunity in trends that likely
have accelerated since 2000. See William P. Marshall, The Last Best Chance for Campaign Finance Reform, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 335, 386 (2000) (“The unique combination
of both [traditionally Republican] federalism and [traditionally Democratic] reform interests . . . could create the type of political dynamic that would make passage of [a devolution] proposal possible.”).
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Whatever one’s view of the current national political dysfunction, it is difficult to deny states a role in either the problem or the solution. Jack Balkin recently listed a dozen causes
of intransigence and gridlock in the current national political
system.245 One-third of the dozen are predominantly policies
that Congress and the Supreme Court have largely left to the
States (primaries, first-past-the-post elections, political gerrymandering, and state laws that discourage the exercise of voting rights by poor and minority voters). Another third were
originally state policies that Congress has preempted in whole
or part, or federal policies the Supreme Court invalidated in
whole or part (single-member districts, campaign finance law,
First Amendment restrictions on campaign finance reform
and primaries, and the dismantling of preclearance under the
Voting Rights Act by Shelby County v. Holder). 246 Other ana-

245. Jack M. Balkin, The Last Days of Disco: Why The American Political System is
Dysfunctional, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1159, 1165–66 (2014). Balkin listed:
(1) Our current system of campaign finance. (2) A primary system that
leads to more ideologically extreme candidates who are unwilling (or
afraid) to compromise, especially—in recent years—in the Republican
Party. (3) The choice of exclusively single-member districts instead of
multimember at-large districts or some version of proportional
representation. (4) Relatedly, the use of first-past-the-post election rules
versus runoffs or proportional representation. (5) Political
gerrymandering designed either to preserve incumbency or to maximize
partisan advantage (which are not the same thing). (6) State electoral laws
and practices designed to restrict or discourage the exercise of voting
rights by poor people and minorities. (7) The decision in Shelby County v.
Holder, which crippled the preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights
Act. (8) First Amendment doctrines that limit campaign finance reform or
prevent reform of the primary system. (9) The organization of House and
Senate committees, which prevent legislation from moving forward. (10)
The elimination of earmarks in appropriations bills, which limits the
scope of potential bargains with individual Congressmen and Senators.
(11) Senate rules involving filibusters, holds, and requirements of
unanimous consent, which have been recently modified or eliminated for
executive and some judicial appointments, but which still delay much
legislation. (12) The so-called Hastert Rule, under which the Speaker of
the House will refuse to allow a vote on legislation supported by a
majority of the House unless a majority of his caucus also supports it.
Id.; see also Yasmin Dawood, Democratic Dysfunction and Constitutional Design, 94
B.U. L. REV. 913 (2014) (arguing that dysfunction arises from too many constraints
on government action under a presidential system).
246. The remaining third are Congressional rules or conventions that states have
no direct role in perpetuating, namely Congressional committee organization,
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lysts reach similar diagnoses based on similar symptoms,
most of which occur at the state level.247 A republican perfectionist, taking a national perspective, might view the first set
of problems as failures of the federal government to act and
the second set of problems as federal mistakes to be corrected
by a future federal regime. A republican pluralist, taking a
state perspective, might see both sets of problems as opportunities for state innovation even where (as in the second set)
contested republican perfectionism at the national level has
limited the possibilities for reform.
In either case, as long as the federal government is unable to
break the gridlock, the States are where the action is. Even if “the
federal government—especially its courts—plays a more significant role today,” which Tokaji and Wolfe endorse, “election administration is still mostly a matter of state law and local practice.” 248 State laws also structure parties and representation
through primaries and redistricting, with significant consequences for national politics, and there is no immediate prospect
of changing that.249 Although these spheres of state political autonomy are coming under increasing pressure from national expenditures in state campaigns—in part to gain national political
control over the crucial state levers of election administration
elimination of earmarks, filibuster and related hold-up rules, and the Hastert
Rule.
247. See CAIN, supra note 51 (urging reforms including equality in election administration, party-building reforms to campaign finance, more selective disclosure laws, limits to the number and duration of elections, moderated direct democracy, and increased campaign finance participation through public funding);
Pildes, supra note 47 (defragmenting political parties through campaign finance
reform, presumably at the state and federal level, to channel money toward party
leaders); Schleicher, supra note 31 (suggesting state electoral reform to mitigate the
problem of “second-order” voting for state officials based on preferences about
federal politics, increase the autonomy of state politics, and improve the functioning of federalism).
248. Tokaji & Wolfe, supra note 100, at 970–71.
249. See Pildes, supra note 108, at 298–319. See also Raymond La Raja & Jonathan
Rauch, The state of state parties—and how strengthening them can improve our politics,
BROOKINGS INST. (2016) (“Historically, and still today, state parties act as a counterforce against highly motivated, ideologically extreme minorities of the sort that
are polarizing and fragmenting American politics. Today, however, state party
organizations are falling behind, partly because the nature of politics has changed
but partly, also, because of disadvantages imposed on them by well-meaning laws
and policies.”).
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and redistricting—state law still sets the ground rules. Most
campaign finance runs through the States. Nearly all election
administration policy comes from the States. Nearly all elected
offices, constituencies, and representative bodies are in the
States. Nearly all redistricting and party regulation occurs at the
state level. In most of these policy areas, there is greater diversity
among election laws in the States today than has existed across
changes at the federal level over the past century.
State politics demonstrate the same diversity relative to national politics for many practices, including participation in
turnout terms, competitiveness in contestation terms, and
equality in campaign finance terms. As the Supreme Court recognized in assessing the line between state and federal qualifications for state officials in Gregory v. Ashcroft,250 the realm of
republicanism itself is an important place for federalism to play
out. “It assures a decentralized government that will be more
sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in
government; and it makes government more responsive by
putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.” 251
States have been, and will continue to be, laboratories of democracy in the term’s most literal sense.252
250. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
251. Id. at 458.
252. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). Beyond the basic inherent value of states’ autonomy in developing
their republican forms of government, William Marshall provides five reasons
state campaign finance laws might be superior to federal campaign finance laws:
(1) mitigating entrenchment, (2) ameliorating unintended consequences, (3) integrating other election laws, (4) increasing citizen participation, and (5) facilitating
policy experimentation. See William Marshall, The Constitutionality of Campaign
Finance Regulation: Should Differences in a State’s Political History and Culture Matter?, 74 MONT. L. REV. 79, 91–92 (2013). Each of these might be extended beyond
campaign finance to election administration, districting and representation, and
party regulation. These reasons are variations on the standard arguments for decentralization under federalism, a classic statement of which is Michael
McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484,
1493 (1987) (“Three important advantages of decentralized decision making
emerge from an examination of the founders’ arguments and the modern literature. First, decentralized decision making is better able to reflect the diversity of
interests and preferences of individuals in different parts of the nation. Second,
allocation of decision making authority to a level of government no larger than
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States are especially suited to experiment in the area of democracy itself. For all the work political theory does in election
law doctrine, a lot of election law is contested on empirical
grounds or otherwise turns on the effect a particular republican
regime has on the public. Bruce Cain notes: “the thresholds for
change at the state and local level are less, and that is where
institutional experimentation should occur.”253 For example, as
Richard Hasen argues, the regulation of false campaign speech
may call for narrower laws or new institutions to facilitate
counterspeech;254 yet the efficacy of such solutions cannot be
known without some experimentation and evaluation at the
state level. When states enjoy greater freedom to diversify their
regimes, they may help resolve intramural debates and perhaps unify reform agendas. Which primary systems minimize
polarization? Which districting standards maximize minority
policymaking power? Which campaign finance systems minimize the appearance of corruption? Which election reforms
maximize voter turnout? Some or all of these questions may
have a right national answer at some point, but nationalization
of the issue by Congress or the Supreme Court may not be the
best way to get there.255 While proposed Congressional reforms
gather dust, some 32 states enacted 94 bills on campaign finance issues alone in 2015.256
In 2000, William Marshall warned of the high stakes involved
in the continued nationalization of election law, with a focus on
campaign finance. “[W]hen the barriers to success are so high,
and the risks of miscalculation so great,” he argued, “the regulatory reform of first resort should be the states and not the federal
necessary will prevent mutually disadvantageous attempts by communities to
take advantage of their neighbors. And third, decentralization allows for innovation and competition in government.”).
253. CAIN, supra note 51, at 214.
254. Richard L. Hasen, A Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elections?,
74 MONT. L. REV. 53 (2013).
255. See, e.g., HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION
SYSTEM IS FAILING AND HOW TO FIX IT (2009) (proposing rankings of state and
local election administration to facilitate experimentation and accountability
through democratic processes).
256. Campaign Finance Legislation Database: 2015 Onward, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (July 2, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/campaign-finance-database-2015-onward.aspx [http://perma.cc/AQZ26JG4].
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government.”257 Similarly, Hasen warns against broad constitutional changes to remedy what may be a transitional period of
dysfunction. 258 After sweeping campaign finance reforms of
BCRA led to Citizens United and Super PACs, after the principle
of meticulous electoral equality in Bush v. Gore led to very little,259 and after the current presidential administration’s reenergized voting rights enforcement was followed by the hobbling of
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 260 caution may call for a lowerstakes approach rather than another risky one-size-fits-all solution. More than a decade ago, Heather Gerken diagnosed what
she called a “doctrinal interregnum,” and suggested the importance of the courts enabling other institutional actors into “a
more dynamic process for resolving these problems than the
command-and-control strategy deployed by the courts thus
far.”261 Bold federal efforts by Congress, the President, and the
Supreme Court, often in incoherent combination, have both exacerbated the flaws of our national republicanism and entrenched them in a three-branch stalemate. It is as urgent as ever
that election law somehow find a way to move on.
A.

State Means

Recall the national Constitution leaves ample space for the
development of republican pluralism consistent with established standards of basic political equality. Nothing prevents
states from structuring their own elections,262 so long as they do
not deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race, 263
sex,264 taxes,265 or age (if eighteen or older),266 or violate appro257. Marshall, supra note 244, at 336.
258. Richard L. Hasen, Political Dysfunction and Constitutional Change, 61 DRAKE
L. REV. 989, 1013–20 (2013).
259. See Justice John Paul Stevens, Bush v. Gore and the Equal Protection Clause,
Address at the American Law Institute 89th Annual Meeting, at 9 (May 21, 2012),
available
at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/public/info/speeches/
ALI%20Speech.pdf [http://perma.cc/M5NW-KGJF] (arguing for heightened scrutiny for partisan gerrymanders under the Equal Protection Clause).
260. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
261. Heather Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and the
Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 539 (2004).
262. See generally Marshall, supra note 244, at 376–91.
263. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
264. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
265. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
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priate legislation enforcing these and other rights.267 Except for
its guarantee of a “Republican Form of Government,” 268 the
original Constitution says little about state elections beyond
repeated implications that the States will have legislatures and
some form of executive and judicial officers.269 As to federal
elections, the Constitution provides states the power to prescribe “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives,”270 subject to alteration by Congress. States also have the power to direct the manner, though
not the time, of appointment for presidential electors.271
Under this constitutional structure it has taken multiple affirmative decisions by Congress, the Supreme Court, or both, to
nationalize state politics to its current extent. These decisions are
most clear in the preemption of “any provision of State law with
respect to election to Federal office” in the Federal Election
Campaign Act.272 Notably, in an era of increasingly strict constructions of Congress’s powers, this arguably exceeds the original understanding of the Elections Clause, which was ratified
only in light of serious entrenchment concerns that militate
against Congress writing its own campaign finance rules.273 This
same trend narrowed federal power under the Voting Rights Act
over voting rights and related redistricting and election administration.274 So it is possible that any move by Congress to devolve republicanism might also involve a nudge by the Supreme
Court. But the Court itself also remains an important obstacle to
266. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
267. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
268. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
269. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“The Senators and Representatives before
mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive
and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be
bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution.”).
270. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (providing for
direct election of Senators).
271. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
272. 52 U.S.C. § 30143(a) (2014).
273. See Robert G. Natelson, The Original Scope of the Congressional Power to Regulate Elections, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 46 (2010) (“The power of Congress to regulate its own elections is a power that, while necessary to address unusual situations, nevertheless invites self-dealing and abuse. In cases of doubt, it must be
narrowly construed.”).
274. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
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devolution, particularly given its increased scrutiny of state election law relative even to federal election law,275 especially when
such scrutiny is unjustified and may be counterproductive.276
States retain some room to maneuver despite the Court’s incoherent approach to republicanism. Even in the area of campaign finance, several Justices have indicated a recognition of
the drawbacks of nationalizing state politics, and at times when
writing on their own, they have expressed a willingness to allow the States more latitude in determining their republican
forms of government. Dissenting in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission,277 Justice Scalia criticized the majority for “set[ting]
their own views—on a practical matter that bears closely upon
the real-life experience of elected politicians and not upon that
of unelected judges—up against the views of 49 (and perhaps
all 50 . . . ) state legislatures and the Federal Congress.”278 Concurring in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,279 Justice
Breyer explained, “Where a legislature has significantly greater
institutional expertise, as, for example, in the field of election
regulation, the Court in practice defers to empirical legislative
judgments—at least where that deference does not risk such
constitutional evils as, say, permitting incumbents to insulate
themselves from effective electoral challenge.”280 Dissenting in
Nixon, Justice Kennedy said he would prefer to “free Congress
or state legislatures to attempt some new reform, if, based upon their own considered view of the First Amendment, it is
possible to do so.” 281 He might have added as a factor the
275. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of
Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 857 (2006) (“In campaign
speech cases, where the survival rate was only 24 percent, all of the federal campaign speech laws adjudicated under strict scrutiny were upheld and only a minority of state laws survived.”); see also Pildes, supra note 99, at 47 (“The federal
courts are less deferential to state judicial interpretations of state election laws,
even in state elections, than the federal courts are in other areas.”). But see Douglas, supra note 138.
276. See supra Part II.A.
277. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
278. Id. at 381 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
279. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
280. Id. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring).
281. Id. at 409–10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S.
230, 264–65 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The universe of
campaign finance regulation is one this Court has in part created and in part per-
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State’s own considered view of another crucial constitutional
provision: the republican form of government.
Of equal importance, state constitutions provide ample
means of regulating both state and federal elections that are
superior to Congress’s own powers. Many state constitutions
guarantee an express right to vote, and some provide “free and
open” elections.282 Several common state constitutional features
increase accountability and reduce the risk of entrenchment.
Twenty-seven states have some form of statutory initiative or
referendum by citizen petition.283 Initiatives, or threats of initiatives, play at least a modest role in electoral reforms, particularly those opposed by incumbent officials.284 While it is a doubleedged sword of accountability and anti-entrenchment, most
states hold elections for judges on their courts of last resort.285
This increased legislative responsiveness to each state’s citizens
facilitates diverse state constitutional and statutory election regimes driven by each state’s “political traditions, structures,
and exigencies,”286 and is therefore likely to be more effective
than nationalization at perfecting any particular conception of
republicanism. More broadly, such an innovative reform as the
“separation of electoral powers” Edward Foley has proposed,287
mitted by its course of decisions. That new order may cause more problems than
it solves.”).
282. See generally Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions,
67 VAND. L. REV. 89, 101–04 (2014).
283. THE BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 149, at 352–53 (Table 6.9), available at
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/Chapter_6.9.pdf
[http://perma.cc/6NYM-FCCC].
284 . See Nathaniel Persily & Melissa Cully Anderson, Regulating Democracy
Through Democracy: The Use of Direct Legislation in Election Law Reform, 78 S. CAL. L.
REV. 997, 1034 (2005).
285. THE BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 149, at 307–09 (Table 5.6), available at
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/Table_5.6.pdf
[http://perma.cc/S955-3CEH]. Thirty-eight states hold retention elections; twentyone states select justices by election. Id. For example, it is hard to imagine any
unelected federal judge offering as detailed a critique of Citizens United as the
Montana Supreme Court’s populist decision and dissent in W. Tradition P’ship v.
Atty. Gen., 271 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock,
132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012).
286. Marshall, supra note 244, at 383.
287. See Foley, supra note 127. It is worth noting that more aggressive interpretations of the Guarantee Clause might deny states either the means or the ends necessary for such an effort toward perfecting republicanism. See, e.g., Berg, supra
note 59, at 242 (arguing state delegation of certain powers violates the republican
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is inconceivable at any but the state level, where novel allocations of judicial, legislative, and executive powers are possible
under flexible state constitutions.
While these features of state politics compare favorably to the
federal status quo, it is possible to overstate their relative benefits. Although in theory it is more difficult for any particular faction to coordinate entrenchment in fifty state legislatures than in
one Congress, state-oriented national campaign and lobbying
groups may exploit the relatively low cost of election or access to
state legislatures where its national principals might achieve relatively high policy payoffs from coordinated state action.288 The
question is whether federal or state efforts are more likely to
counter these nationalizing trends. Effective regulations for such
campaign and lobbying groups may be more likely to come
from locally responsive and institutionally diverse state offices
than from the FEC, IRS, or other federal agencies with at best
indirect jurisdiction over (and indirect interest in) such groups.
Even if, despite the States’ structural defenses, entrenchment in
the States were more of a problem than entrenchment in Congress, this does not argue for continued nationalization. It is a fallacy of composition to conclude that the effect of increased state
entrenchment on federal elections is necessarily increased entrenchment in federal offices.289 For example, any one state legislature may well manipulate campaign finance, the primary process,
voter identification requirements, or the Electoral College. Several
analysts find “[p]artisan manipulation of election laws in an effort
to help one’s own party win” may be on the rise.290 But across all
guarantee); Heller, supra note 34, at 1759–60 (arguing that constitutional initiatives
that may not be modified by the legislature violate the republican guarantee).
288. See Patrick M. Garry et al., Raising The Question Of Whether Out-Of-State
Political Contributions May Affect A Small State’s Political Autonomy: A Case Study Of
The South Dakota Voter Referendum On Abortion, 55 S.D. L. REV. 35, 46 (2010); Mike
McIntyre, Conservative Nonprofit Acts as a Stealth Business Lobbyist, N.Y. TIMES
(April 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/us/alec-a-tax-exempt-groupmixes-legislators-and-lobbyists.html?_r=4&hp [http://perma.cc/DJ6K-4YVC] (describing the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) state-oriented lobby).
289. See generally Adrian Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution,
123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (2009) (“[M]ultiple failures of the ideal can offset one another, producing a closer approximation to the ideal at the level of the overall
system.”).
290. Foley, supra note 127, at 141; see also Dawood, supra note 138; Joshua A.
Douglas, supra note 138, at 594.
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fifty states, entrenchment effects can offset each other as the mixture of different election law regimes produces a more diverse
Congress and Presidential Electors that could not be attributable
(as it may be now) to a single entrenched federal regime.
Madison, of course, foresaw how national republicanism
properly conceived still may allow “[t]he influence of factious
leaders [to] kindle a flame within their particular States.”291 But
so long as states remain under the broad shield of the republican guarantee, they “will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States.”292 The same diversity of policies at the state level also ameliorates unintended consequences
by internalizing most of the costs of a dysfunctional policy and
limiting the rest of the costs to the impact of one state among
fifty. Such risks of factious or partisan conflagration have been
reduced over time with the additional federal constitutional
guarantees of basic political equality, and the various state constitutional innovations to circumvent self-interested officials
discussed above.
In the worst-case scenario, a state’s entrenched regime is still
more likely than an entrenched federal regime to align with its
citizens’ distinct republican values. A state’s citizens bear responsibility for the quality of their republican form of government, which, by definition, is a government its citizens can control. States may not only better internalize their policies, but
also better integrate their policies. National policies, on the other hand, can blunder on their merits as well as in their interaction with state policies. As William Marshall argues:
Allowing states to adjust their campaign finance rules to reflect such [local] realities would both assist the states in enacting legislation that corresponds to their other laws governing elections and perhaps encourage the states to more
thoroughly analyze proposed election laws through the lens
of its effects on campaign funding issues.293

Both of these interests hold as true for an overly strict or liberal campaign finance regime as they do for election admin291. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 136 (James Madison) (Benjamin Wright ed.,
1961).
292. Id.
293. Marshall, supra note 139, at 92.
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istration, redistricting, and primary systems, as well as for
their potential interactions.
Finally, any proposal that urges the Supreme Court or Congress to “correct” or perfect state republicanism must account
for the endogeneity of those institutions to the political system
the states help structure. As Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule
explain, “[j]udges are inside the political system, not outside
it,”294 and any dominant party in Congress that enjoys the political unity to advance major changes to the political process
“will have the least interest in enacting them.”295 It is not clear
that a deeply divided Supreme Court or Congress that is, in
part, a product of deeply divided federal political processes (as
well as earlier federal judicial and legislative regulation and
deregulation of political processes) will be any better positioned to rise above entrenched dysfunction than the States. In
countering such dysfunction, it may be more effective to recognize and work through the States’ central role in any process
of reforming national republicanism.
B.

Republican Ends

Devolution of the reform of republicanism to the States
might result in deep structural reforms to campaigns and elections, perpetuation of the status quo, or deregulation. Whatever the result, it is more likely to be internally coherent within
each state, flexible, and reflective of citizens’ specific concep-

294. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1743, 1757 (2013). A recent confirmation of the judiciary’s situation within
politics, as well as the dysfunction between the other two branches, is the Senate’s
unprecedented refusal to consider an elected President’s Supreme Court nominee
until after the President’s successor is elected. See Robin Bradley Kar & Jason
Mazzone, Why President Obama Has the Constitutional Power to Appoint—and Not
Just Nominate—a Replacement for Justice Scalia (Mar. 21,
2016),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2752287 [http://perma.cc/82GG-B4M2]. Another such
confirmation, with direct application to questions of republican pluralism, is the
commitment of both candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination “to
use opposition to Citizens United as a litmus test for Supreme Court nominees.”
Matea Gold & Anne Gearan, Hillary Clinton’s litmus test for Supreme Court nominees: a pledge to overturn Citizens United, WASH. POST (May 14, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/05/14/hillaryclintons-litmus-test-for-supreme-court-nominees-a-pledge-to-overturn-citizensunited/ [http://perma.cc/TS8W-3MGR].
295. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 294, at 1759.
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tions of a republican form of government than the current
patchwork of uneven judicial doctrine, regulation, and enforcement accumulated through attempts to nationalize state
politics. Each state has its own political culture, reflected in the
distinctions discussed above. As William Marshall puts it,
“[S]ome of the differences in political culture between the
states may express very different views of democratic theory . . . . [I]ndeed, each state appears to express its own theory of
democracy.”296 In addition to holding distinct values, the States
also generate vastly different political dynamics driven by
things like media markets and the size of legislative districts.297
Bruce Cain observes in arguing for a “metapluralist” approach
to reform pluralism that “[c]onsistency of any one approach is
not possible.”298 It takes different means, and perhaps different
ends, to govern different political systems.
Beyond each state’s republicanism, however, republican pluralism among the States also may be the last best chance for
reforming national republicanism. Some reformers favor devolution to the states for its own sake. For them, the best approach would extend republican pluralism closer to the outer
limits of the republican guarantee consistent with weak enforcement of basic political equality. These pure pluralists
would roll back relatively modest federal efforts to fund and
regulate state and local election administration. They might
celebrate the hobbling of the Voting Rights Act and limit its
remaining enforcement to “first generation” barriers to voting
itself, supplemented by Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment
prohibitions on discrimination. They would step back from national debates over Congressional gerrymandering and perhaps even repeal the federal single-member restriction on Congressional districts. 299 They would oppose further judicial
regulation of state primary processes. And they would be as
critical of the current Supreme Court’s campaign finance doctrine as they are supportive of its voting rights decisions,
though they would cheer challenges to BCRA’s regulation of

296. Marshall, supra note 139, at 86.
297. See id. at 82–83.
298. CAIN, supra note 51, at 195 (emphasis omitted).
299. See 2 U.S.C. § 2(c) (2012).
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state parties.300 Perhaps, they hope, Congress will repeal or the
Supreme Court will invalidate federal preemption of state
campaign finance regulation of federal campaigns.301 The States
would take it from there.
Other reformers should consider embracing republican pluralism to achieve non-pluralist ends, however. Republican pluralism is a fact, and contested republican values like accountability and participation, majority rule and minority
representation, deliberation and responsiveness, equality and
liberty of influence, legitimacy and self-expression, competition
and stability may conflict inherently or in implementation. But
even perfectionist reformers who believe in any one of these
values may find more success in realizing it nationally by developing it in the States. They should embrace pluralism as a
source of innovation, and make a virtue out of the necessary
premise that states vary widely in their republican forms of
government. Reform of the national government is impossible
without working through the States, even for one-size-fits-all
solutions. There is no way past national political dysfunction
but through it, and cultivating pluralism in the states may provide a more effective means toward national perfectionist ends.
1.

Competition

Some of the most important factors of political competition
are already controlled by the States. The States can be particularly effective agents of anti-entrenchment for federal officials
because state, rather than federal, officials make the rules.
Across the range of election laws, it is more difficult to capture
fifty state legislatures than it is to capture Congress. In election
administration, this difference has made further progress on
uniform registration, early voting, and voter identification difficult beyond reforms of the past two decades, but it also has
prevented uniform retrenchment on these fronts. Election administration may be excessively partisan toward one party in
some states, but at least it is not uniformly partisan toward a
single party across all states.
300. See, e.g., Complaint at 1, Republican Party of La. v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
No. 15-cv-01241-CRC (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 2015).
301. See 52 U.S.C. § 30143(a) (2014).
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Similarly, despite the high national political stakes, many
states have begun to innovate politically independent redistricting processes; there is no guarantee that a national nudge
toward redistricting reform from an already deeply gerrymandered Congress would be in the direction of reform rather than
retrenchment. States’ roles in party regulation, particularly
through the primary system, also have more potential to counteract polarization by reflecting and preserving distinct state
party values. Finally, states also might fix the federal campaign
finance system, for their own Congressional delegations and in
their own ways, if Congress would only let them.
2.

Equality

Equality often involves a clear tradeoff with other values, such
as liberty. This is all the more reason to leave the expression of
such values primarily to the States. Assuming a national reformer
wished to increase political equality beyond the basic political
equality established by the Constitution, particularly in terms of
preventing corruption and equalizing the access and influence
enjoyed mainly by wealthy interest groups over Congress (as well
as state officials), states provide a novel approach to a fraught issue. With minor exceptions,302 federal campaign finance law sets
one-size-fits-all rules regardless of a candidate’s constituency.
Federal individual contribution limits for 2016 are $2,700 to federal candidates, and federal contribution disclosure is triggered at
$200, regardless of whether that candidate’s constituency is the
United States or Wyoming’s one at-large congressional district
(which is more than 500 times smaller in population).303 Federal
regulation of coordination and electioneering expenditures is
complex to the point of inefficacy and is underenforced.
If campaign finance regulation of federal candidates were returned to the States, these thresholds could reflect each state’s
balance of anti-corruption and (within the bounds established by

302. Federally coordinated party expenditure limits vary depending on the voting-age population of each state. See 52 U.S.C. § 30116 (2014).
303. See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, CONTRIBUTION LIMITS FOR 2015-2016 FEDERAL
ELECTIONS
(2015),
http://www.fec.gov/info/contriblimitschart1516.pdf
[http://perma.cc/6YUT-DYYK]; 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(A) (2012); 52 U.S.C.
§ 30104(b)(3)(A) (2012).
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the anti-corruption interest) equality interests.304 States may increase the candidate contribution limits to check the influence of
Super PACs funded by the super-wealthy (even at the expense
of increasing contributions by the moderately wealthy), or reduce disclosure requirements to invite larger anonymous contributions by publicity-shy donors who might otherwise give nominal amounts. Other states may reduce the contribution
maximums and disclosure thresholds, reflecting lesser campaign
costs or greater concerns about corruption. A few states might
extend public financing to Congressional elections. Some states
may deregulate campaign finance for their federal elections altogether. And any state might enforce its laws more effectively
than the FEC currently enforces federal law.
3.

Representation

Multiple state rules bear on the quality of representation
federal elections can provide, at least in terms of federal officials’ policy alignment with their state-based constituencies. A
state’s redistricting process will shape a federal candidate’s
electorate directly. The state election calendar and party regulation, interacting in the primary process, also will impact
whether a candidate is elected with a broader or narrower
base of support. State-specific campaign finance rules may
determine whether a candidate can rely on larger individual
or political committee contributions within the district to fund
most of a campaign, or must depend on support from national
Super PACs or activist out-of-state donors.
The remarkable variation in representational alignment
among states raises basic questions about how reformers might
improve representation at the state and federal levels, given the
array of electoral rules, regimes, and systems states control.
Stephanopoulos, McGhee, and Rogers cite sore loser laws, early
voting, contribution limits, and independent redistricting commissions as increasing alignment, and public financing, term
limits, and open primaries as possibly reducing alignment. 305
Within any one state seeking to maximize alignment, nearly all
304. See generally Anthony Johnstone, Recalibrating Campaign Finance Law, 32
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 217 (2013).
305. See Stephanopoulos, McGhee & Rogers, supra note 210, at 829–30.
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of these reforms could apply to federal elections, except for term
limits (which may compromise alignment) and campaign finance reforms (unless federal preemption is repealed).
4.

Participation

Participation provides one of the clearest opportunities for
progress in the States, given the wide range of voter turnout
and campaign finance participation. National reforms to voter
registration have fallen short, and other national reforms like
BCRA’s regulation of state party get-out-the-vote efforts run
counter to efforts at increasing participation. State turnout is a
complicated function of each state’s political culture and legal
system, which itself arises from interactions among election
administration, districting, party regulation, and campaign finance regimes. Within a state’s election administration regime,
different tradeoffs between early voting and polling hours, or
voter ID requirements and mail voting opportunities, could
produce distinct participation outcomes depending on interactions with other rules and regimes, as well as demographics
and geography. Early and mail voting may increase turnout in
some states but enable procrastination in others that would
benefit more from more convenient polling places or hours.
States that already provide ample voting opportunities might
concentrate instead on increasing political competition through
redistricting or campaign finance. The mix will be different for
each state and will always be constrained by limited resources.
But the logic of republican pluralism suggests that any fixed set
of financial and political resources dedicated to increasing participation (or pursuing other values) will result in a greater
payoff when working within a state’s distinct republicanism.
Full participation includes citizen participation in forming
and reforming the rules that govern their republic.306 This may
be especially important for campaign finance given the extremely narrow section of Americans that donate.307 Increased

306. See Marshall, supra note 139, at 92–93.
307. See Lee Drutman, The Political 1% of the 1% in 2012, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION
BLOG (June 24, 2013), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/06/24/1pct_of_
the_1pct/ [http://perma.cc/AK4Z-VE53] (“More than a quarter of the nearly $6
billion in contributions from identifiable sources in the last federal campaign cycle
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participation itself helps perfect the republican form of government, of which Madison deemed essential “that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it.”308 Spencer Overton,
articulating a modern variation of what he calls “the Participation Interest,” explains that “[p]articipation exposes the electorate to a variety of ideas and viewpoints, furthers selfgovernment, and enhances the legitimacy of government decisions.” 309 Moreover, citizens’ increased participation in structuring politics at the state level can and should influence the
structure of politics at the federal level. As Franita Tolson explains, “[F]ederal officials have to answer to dual constituencies; the idea that the state is not one of these interest groups is
a legal fiction, and sometimes the ‘people’ speak best through
their state legislatures.”310 If states could amplify citizens’ voices in setting the federal political agenda through how they send
their representatives to Washington, rather than simply whom
they send, that would itself be a worthy end.
CONCLUSION
States are as much republics, and at least as competent at republicanism, as is the Union in its current state. A court wrestling with the post-Citizens United era recently held: “It is fundamental to the definition of our national political community
that foreign citizens do not have a constitutional right to participate in, and thus may be excluded from, activities of democratic
self-government.”311 This suggests an equally fundamental but
came from just 31,385 individuals, a number equal to one ten-thousandth of the
U.S. population.”).
308. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 237 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
309. Spencer Overton, The Participation Interest, 100 GEO. L. J. 1259, 1273 (2012).
310. Franita Tolson, Partisan Gerrymandering as a Safeguard of Federalism, 2010
UTAH L. REV. 859, 909 (arguing that partisan gerrymandering in state legislatures
reinforces federalism by providing a means to influence the composition of their
federal congressional delegations).
311. Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm’n., 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288 (D.D.C. 2011),
aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012); see also Evenwel v. Abbott, No. 14-940 (U.S. Apr. 4,
2016), slip op. at 15 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“States are free to
serve as ‘laboratories’ of democracy. That ‘laboratory’ extends to experimenting
about the nature of democracy itself.”).
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more modest corollary for our state republics: any state’s citizens
have a constitutional right to participate in, and thus should be
included in, its own activities of democratic self-government.
Foremost among those activities is asking what democratic selfgovernment, or republicanism, means. The answer to that question is not likely to come from the federal government anytime
soon. It may be worth asking the States.

